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REVISITING CLAIM AND ISSUE PRECLUSION IN
WASHINGTON
Kathleen M. McGinnis *
Abstract: When it comes to the law of claim and issue preclusion, Washington courts and
practitioners encounter rules and precedent that tend to be unnecessarily complicated, overly
broad, and even—in some instances—simply wrong. Three decades ago, Professor Philip
Trautman urged Washington courts to clarify and modernize the doctrine. A fresh look at the
topic suggests that while courts have been receptive to the professor’s advice, the goal of a
clear and usable body of preclusion law will require more work. Specifically, Washington
courts should address three problems. First, they should simplify the test for claim
preclusion, eliminating redundant and confusing elements to make the test more consistent
with prevailing modern rules. Instead of clinging to a four-element test that includes a fourfactor subtest, the courts should simply examine identity of parties and claims, and should
use a transactional test to determine claim-identity. Second, Washington courts should
abandon the discredited doctrine of virtual representation, which has bound nonparties to the
results of actions in which they either testified or had an advisory role. This use of nonparty
preclusion violates litigants’ due process rights, and wastes resources by encouraging
litigants to argue the theory even though it is rarely a successful defense. While it might be
defensible to preclude nonparties when the earlier action involved an assertion of public
rights, courts should proceed with caution, and ensure that Washington’s current rule applies
only in the most limited circumstances. Third, Washington courts need to consider Full Faith
and Credit principles in every case that involves a judgment from another state or federal
court. Ignoring these principles has led courts to apply the wrong preclusion law to
judgments of other courts, a practice that harms litigants and undermines the legitimacy of
the courts’ decisions.

INTRODUCTION .................................................................................. 76
I. THE ARTICLE ................................................................................ 78
A. Claim Preclusion .................................................................... 81
1. Identity of Subject Matter .............................................. 81
2. Identity of Claim or Cause of Action ............................. 82
3. Identity of Persons and Parties ....................................... 84
4. Identity of Quality of Persons ........................................ 85
5. Final Judgment on the Merits......................................... 85
6. Character of the Tribunal ............................................... 87
*
Senior Lecturer, University of Washington School of Law (mcginnis@uw.edu). I thank my
colleagues Elizabeth Porter, Karen Boxx, and Sarah Kaltsounis for their comments and advice, and
the Gallagher Law Library reference librarians for their research assistance. In addition, I thank
Professor Philip Trautman for his generous help as I learned how to teach civil procedure and
attempted to emulate his deep understanding of the subject.

75

06 - McGinnis, Final Auth with TOC.docx (Do Not Delete)

76

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

4/13/2015 11:49 AM

[Vol. 90:75

B.

Issue Preclusion ...................................................................... 88
1. Identical Issue ................................................................ 88
2. Final Judgment ............................................................... 89
3. Persons Bound ............................................................... 90
4. Doing Justice .................................................................. 91
II. PROFESSOR TRAUTMAN’S ARTICLE IN THE COURTS ....... 93
A. Pragmatic Approach to Preclusion Law ................................. 93
B. Claim Preclusion’s Overly Complex Test .............................. 98
1. Identical Subject Matter ................................................. 99
2. “Quality of the Persons” Test....................................... 105
3. Testing Identity of Claim or Cause of Action .............. 109
III. EMERGING PROBLEMS IN WASHINGTON PRECLUSION
LAW .............................................................................................. 111
A. Nonparty Preclusion ............................................................. 111
1. The Supreme Court’s Due-Process-Based Rejection
of Virtual Representation ............................................. 113
2. Nonparty Preclusion in Washington ............................ 116
a. Virtual Representation ........................................... 117
b. Nonparty Preclusion in Public Law Cases ............ 124
3. Why We Should Care About Nonparty Preclusion...... 126
a. The Resource Conservation Problem ..................... 126
b. The Due Process Problem ...................................... 127
c. The Forced Intervention Problem .......................... 129
4. An Exception for Cases of Public Concern? ................ 131
B. Full Faith and Credit Problems in Washington Courts ........ 138
CONCLUSION .................................................................................... 144

INTRODUCTION
Thirty years ago, the Washington Law Review published Claim and
Issue Preclusion in Civil Litigation in Washington, 1 an article by prolific
scholar 2 and esteemed teacher 3 Philip A. Trautman. Professor Trautman
chose to address this “age-old topic” in order to report on development
of the doctrine in Washington State courts and then to “suggest what
1. Philip A. Trautman, Claim and Issue Preclusion in Civil Litigation in Washington, 60 WASH.
L. REV. 805 (1985).
2. Over a thirty-year period beginning in 1958, Professor Trautman published seventeen articles
in the Washington Law Review, plus two more articles in the Gonzaga Law Review and the
Willamette Law Review.
3. From 1956 to 2006, Professor Trautman taught generations of students at the University of
Washington School of Law about Civil Procedure and Conflicts of Laws. He won the University of
Washington Distinguished Teaching Award in 1987. In addition, students at the School of Law
named him Teacher of the Year for 1982–1983, 1991–1992, and 1995–1996.
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may be forthcoming.” 4 At its core, the article called for doctrinal clarity
and a pragmatic approach to preclusion law—a position that would
require courts to provide more guidance, and, ideally, to simplify some
of the complex, multi-level tests they used for claim and issue
preclusion. Washington practitioners and judges immediately turned to
Professor Trautman’s commentary on the subject, and, even more
notable, continue to rely on it well into the twenty-first century. 5
Although the article appears to have been a valuable reference—a sort of
preclusion primer—for practitioners and courts in Washington, the
courts have not fully responded to the specific changes that Professor
Trautman advocated. Some of those problems remain unresolved.
Moreover, other problems in Washington’s claim and issue preclusion
doctrine have developed and become more significant since Professor
Trautman’s canonical work was published.
This Article identifies three important problems that have remained
unresolved or emerged since Professor Trautman’s article, and
recommends ways Washington law should change to improve efficiency
and clarity—both central values behind preclusion law—and to conform
to the due process standards the United States Supreme Court has
imposed on the federal law of preclusion. Solving these problems in
Washington’s preclusion doctrine will require action by the Washington
State Supreme Court. Instead of dealing with preclusion law mainly as a
sidebar in cases that involve important substantive conflicts, the court
should grant review in cases that present opportunities to focus on
procedure and clarify the law.
First, the Washington State Supreme Court should restructure the
four-element identity test for claim preclusion, which currently requires
courts to address eight analytic steps. The Court should pare its identity
test down to the two elements that actually matter: precluding
relitigation of identical claims between identical parties, or those in
privity. The Court should also evaluate identity of claims by using the
simpler “transactional nucleus of facts” test, instead of the four factors
Washington courts use now. A streamlined approach to claim preclusion
would simplify the analysis required of practitioners and courts alike,
making litigation more efficient and outcomes more predictable.
Second, the Court should abandon the discredited doctrine of virtual
representation, which permits issue preclusion to bind some litigants
4. Trautman, supra note 1, at 805.
5. See, e.g., Fluke Capital & Mgmt. Servs. Co. v. Richmond, 106 Wash. 2d 614, 618, 724 P.2d
356, 360 (1986); Brownfield v. City of Yakima, 178 Wash. App. 850, 870, 316 P.3d 520, 531
(2014).
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who were not parties to the original action. Rejecting the doctrine would
protect litigants’ legitimate expectations of a day in court that they
control, and would satisfy due process concerns. The United States
Supreme Court recognizes several categories of nonparty preclusion. If
the Washington State Supreme Court elects to go beyond those
recognized exceptions, it should do so only in cases that involve serial
litigation over a public rather than private right, and patently adequate
representation in the first proceeding. Before taking that step, however,
the Court should examine how existing joinder mechanisms could help
parties avoid repetitive litigation over matters of public concern. This
would allow Washington courts to avoid controversial decisions on the
scope of nonparty preclusion.
Third, the Court should insist that every Washington court engage in
the proper analysis and give appropriate full faith and credit to
judgments from federal courts and other state courts.
Part I of this Article will describe Professor Trautman’s article, place
it in context, and highlight his recommendations to Washington courts.
Part II will address how those courts have used Professor Trautman’s
article. 6 The Article will conclude in Part III by analyzing some
problematic areas of preclusion law that have developed since Professor
Trautman’s examination thirty years ago.
I.

THE ARTICLE
If citations to an article can represent influence, 7 it is easy to say that

6. Although this Article presents an obvious opportunity to comprehensively update Professor
Trautman’s research, that is not its mission. A lawyer looking for treatise-style treatment of
preclusion law in Washington already has an excellent resource in 14A KARL TEGLAND,
WASHINGTON PRACTICE SERIES, CIVIL PROCEDURE §§ 35:20–35:52 (2d ed. 2013). Therefore, this
Article will focus on the extent to which Professor Trautman’s article may have influenced the
development of Washington law, and on unresolved problems in preclusion doctrine.
7. This is a debatable proposition, to be sure. But citology is “a thing.” The significance of the
timing and frequency of citations to law review articles in other law review articles is a hot
scholarly topic. See, e.g., Fred R. Shapiro & Michelle Pearse, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles
of All Time, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1483 (2012); Ian Ayres & Fredrick E. Vars, Determinants of
Citations to Articles in Elite Law Reviews, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 427 (2000) (finding, inter alia, that
“citations per year peak at 4 years after publication, and an article receives half of its expected total
lifetime citations after 4.6 years”). Citation studies have also focused on oft-cited judges. See
William M. Landes, Lawrence Lessig & Michael E. Solimine, Judicial Influence: A Citation
Analysis of Federal Courts of Appeals Judges, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 271 (1998). Most interesting for
present purposes is the degree to which appellate courts cite law review articles. At least one study
revealed that courts are far less liberal with citations to law review articles than are academics citing
to each other’s articles. See Deborah J. Merritt & Melanie Putnam, Judges and Scholars: Do Courts
and Scholarly Journals Cite the Same Law Review Articles?, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 871 (1996).
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Professor Trautman’s article helped shape the development of preclusion
law in Washington. At least seventy-eight judicial decisions, including
sixty-one Washington appellate court opinions, have cited the article in
the past three decades, beginning shortly after publication 8 and
continuing to the present. 9 To put that in context, the sixty-one citations
in Washington appellate court opinions represent more than four percent
of approximately 1441 decisions in which those courts cited to any law
review or law journal article during the same thirty-year period. 10 At a
more local level, the sixty-one citations represent over seventeen percent
of the citations by Washington appellate courts to any writing published
in the Washington Law Review since 1985. 11
One can only speculate about the reasons for the article’s popularity,
but its elegant and understated clarity surely must be on the list.
Significantly, Professor Trautman’s writing was pitched to a receptive
audience of practitioners and judges, in an era when the work product of
the legal academy was criticized as out-of-touch with the needs and
interests of the practicing bar. 12 In tandem with what was then Orland’s

8. See Fluke Capital & Mgmt. Serv. Co., 106 Wash. 2d at 618, 724 P.2d at 360. According to
WestlawNext “Citing References” tool, Fluke is the first of sixty-one Washington appellate court
decisions to cite Professor Trautman’s article.
9. See Walker v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P., No. C14-709JLR, 2015 WL 999920, at *5
(W.D. Wash. Mar. 5, 2015) (most recent citation found in WestlawNext as of March 15, 2015).
10. Using WestlawNext, the author estimates that the Washington Supreme Court and Court of
Appeals have cited to law review articles in 1441 opinions since January 1, 1986—shortly after
publication of Professor Trautman’s article. The estimate was reached by searching in Westlaw’s
Washington appellate courts database for decisions during the relevant period for terms that would
normally be used to cite law reviews. These terms include “L.Rev.,” “Law Review,” “L.J.,” “Law
Journal,” “J.L.,” and “Journal of Law,” and in addition, variants on those terms with different
punctuation or spacing. Cases were then checked to screen out irrelevant hits. The sixty-one cites to
the Trautman article represent 4.23% of the decisions in which Washington state appellate courts
cited to any law review article after 1985. (Please note that the search methodology is somewhat
rudimentary, and that results could vary if different research tools and search terms were employed.
The intent is merely to suggest that Professor Trautman’s single article occupies a noticeable
amount of space in Washington appellate court decisions.)
11. Id. The estimated number of cites to the Washington Law Review (350) came from searching
the WestlawNext database of Washington appellate court decisions after January 1, 1986, for
“Wash. L. Rev.” and variations on the term. The 61 Washington appellate court cites to the
Trautman article were divided by the total number of citations to the Washington Law Review to
yield 17.4%.
12. See Merritt & Putnam, supra note 7, at 871–72, and authorities collected therein. E.g., Ellen
A. Peters, Reality and the Language of the Law, 90 YALE L. J. 1193, 1193 (1981) (Connecticut
Supreme Court Justice stating “there is an increasing divergence between the theoretical interests of
the aspiring academic lawyer and the pragmatic interests of the successful practitioner.”); Patricia
M. Wald, Teaching the Trade: An Appellate Judge’s View of Practice Oriented Legal Education, 36
J. LEGAL EDUC. 35, 42 (1986) (Former chief judge for the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit asserting that “[t]oo few law review articles prove helpful in appellate
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Washington Practice series, 13 the article gave Washington lawyers the
essential tools they needed to diagnose the type of preclusion problem
faced by a client, predict what a court might or should do, and develop
an argument for the court. Professor Trautman used the Restatement
(Second) of Judgments 14 to subtly advocate that the courts articulate a
clear and pragmatic set of modern rules to govern preclusion decisions. 15
Professor Trautman immediately signaled his fondness for the
Restatement by nudging his readers to refer to the preclusive effect of
judgments with modern terminology: claim preclusion and issue
preclusion. 16 He described the confusion that sometimes resulted from
the courts’ tendency to use the term res judicata to mean either the entire
subject of preclusion, or the narrower doctrine of merger and bar,
modernly called claim preclusion. 17
After sketching the policy considerations around the common law of
preclusion—a basic conflict between principles that favor finality of
judgments and those that tolerate relitigation in order to assure a correct
result 18—Professor Trautman asserted that “Washington courts have
generally favored finality.” 19 He then explained related doctrines: stare
decisis, 20 election of remedies, 21 preclusion of inconsistent positions, 22
law of the case, 23 and inconsistent judgments. 24

decision making. They tend to be too talky, too unselective in separating the relevant from the
irrelevant, too exhaustive, too exhausting, too hedged, too cautious about reaching a definite
conclusion.”).
13. Karl Tegland, current author of the series and also an authority on the law of procedure, said
“[t]he Trautman article focuses primarily on Washington cases and is a highly respected authority,
still cited by Washington’s courts.” 14A TEGLAND, supra note 6, § 35:32.
14. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS (1982).
15. Trautman, supra note 1, at 817, 821, 823–24, 833–35.
16. Id. at 805. In accord with the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS (1982), the United
States Supreme Court at the time also employed the terms claim preclusion and issue preclusion.
See Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75 (1984). Claim preclusion replaces
res judicata and issue preclusion substitutes for collateral estoppel.
17. Trautman, supra note 1, at 805.
18. Id. at 806.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 807.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 809.
23. Id. at 810.
24. Id. at 812.
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Claim Preclusion

Claim preclusion prevents relitigation of a claim or cause of action
that was litigated between the same parties in a previous action.25 This is
an affirmative defense in Washington courts, 26 and the party raising the
defense has the burden of proving that the claim should not be
relitigated. 27
Professor Trautman reported that the Washington State Supreme
Court had used the same claim preclusion test for nearly seven
decades. 28 A judgment has claim preclusive effect only if the proponent
can show that two successive proceedings are identical in “(1) subject
matter, (2) cause of action, (3) persons and parties, and (4) the quality of
the persons for or against whom the claim is made.” 29 He noted a dearth
of judicial guidance on two of the four elements: identity of subject
matter 30 and identity of quality of persons. 31 On those relatively
unexamined elements, Professor Trautman advocated that courts take a
“pragmatic, functional approach.” 32 This approach, in the typical case,
would have the effect of merging coordinate elements: subject matter
with cause of action, and quality of persons with identical persons and
parties. 33
Even if the four identity elements are satisfied, the judgment must be
final and on the merits in order to have preclusive effect. 34 Judgments
from courts, administrative agencies, and arbitrators can all be
preclusive. 35
1.

Identity of Subject Matter

Professor Trautman observed that Washington courts seldom decided
cases based on identity of subject matter, and that, typically, courts
“simply state[d] in a conclusory fashion that there is or is not the same

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 805.
WASH. SUPER. CT. R. CIV. P. 8(c).
Trautman, supra note 1, at 812.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 812–13.
Id. at 820–21.
Id. at 820.
See infra notes 189–193, 210–213 and accompanying text.
Trautman, supra note 1, at 822.
Id. at 825–26.
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subject matter.” 36 In addition, courts tended to list the two elements of
identical subject matter and cause of action, but then merge the two in
their analysis. 37 The clear implication was that it was more helpful for
courts to analyze the “nature of the cause of action or claim.” 38
2.

Identity of Claim or Cause of Action

The element of identity of claim or cause of action was far more
developed than the same subject matter element was in 1985, and
Professor Trautman described it extensively. Claim preclusion applies
“to what might, or should, have been litigated as well as to what was
actually litigated, if all part of the same claim or cause of action.”39 The
obvious case for claim preclusion is when a claimant who won in the
first action sues a second time on the very same claim. Her second claim
is precluded, having been merged in the first action’s judgment. 40 The
harder case is when a litigant splits his claims. Professor Trautman cited
the example of a party to a contract successfully suing for specific
performance, and later suing for damages for performance delays that
accrued before the first lawsuit was filed. 41 Claim preclusion is justified
in that situation because the litigant should have pursued both theories of
relief in the first action. 42
Professor Trautman explained two relatively clear points of doctrine.
First, a litigant cannot justify successive actions by changing his theory
of recovery, as in the example above. 43 Second, the mere availability of
alternative remedies does not create separate claims. 44 Beyond that
relatively solid doctrinal ground, Professor Trautman explained
36. Id. at 813.
37. Id. See infra notes 165–193 and accompanying text.
38. Trautman, supra note 1, at 813.
39. Id. at 814. This is what distinguishes claim preclusion from issue preclusion, which is
narrower in that it precludes only those issues actually litigated, but broader in that it applies in the
context of a new claim or cause of action. See id. at 805, 813–14, 829.
40. See id. at 805 (explaining traditional “merger” and “bar” terminology: judgment for a
successful plaintiff merges all rights to the same claim into that judgment, while judgment in favor
of a defendant bars further claims).
41. Id. at 814–15.
42. Id. The claim-splitting example illustrates how claim preclusion advances efficiency while
remaining fair to the litigant. The litigant controlled the first action, and had an opportunity to bring
all theories of relief before the court in a single action. Preclusion gives him the incentive to litigate
once instead of twice—a situation that allows courts to function more efficiently, and prevents
harassment of the defendant through repetitious litigation.
43. Id. at 815.
44. Id.
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Washington courts were not always consistent in how they evaluated
what belonged in the same claim or cause of action.45
Indeed, the Washington State Supreme Court mentioned this
imprecision 46 in a decision that went on to borrow from federal law four
criteria courts could consider to evaluate the scope of a claim:
(1) [W]hether rights or interests established in the prior
judgment would be destroyed or impaired by prosecution of the
second action; (2) whether substantially the same evidence is
presented in the two actions; (3) whether the two suits involve
infringement of the same right; and (4) whether the two suits
arise out of the same transactional nucleus of facts.47
The problem with this test, according to Professor Trautman, was that
one could not predict whether a Washington court would use a “same
evidence” analysis, or a “same rights” analysis, or examine “whether a
second proceeding would negate the first.” 48 The unpredictability and
the multiplicity of tests made it difficult for practitioners to know which
they could rely upon to provide advice. 49 The solution he proposed was
to use the fourth factor laid out by the Rains court: “whether the two
suits arise out of the same transactional nucleus of facts.” 50 This test
better reflected what Professor Trautman suspected the courts actually
wanted: “a commonsense, functional approach.” 51
Professor Trautman had support for this suggestion in section 24 of
the Second Restatement. This test would extend claim preclusion to “all
rights . . . to remedies . . . with respect to all or any part of the
transaction, or series of connected transactions, out of which the action
arose.” 52 Under the Restatement, the transaction or series of transactions
would be assessed “pragmatically, giving weight to such considerations
as whether the facts are related in time, space, origin, or motivation,
whether they form a convenient trial unit, and whether their treatment as
a unit conforms to the parties’ expectations or business understanding or
usage.” 53
45. Id. at 816.
46. Rains v. State, 100 Wash. 2d 660, 664, 674 P.2d 165, 169 (1983).
47. Id. at 664, 674 P.2d at 168 (quoting Costantini v. Trans World Airlines, 681 F.2d 1199, 1201–
02 (9th Cir. 1982)); see also Trautman, supra note 1, at 816.
48. Trautman, supra note 1, at 816–17.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 817 (quoting Rains, 100 Wash. 2d at 664, 674 P.2d at 165).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 817–18 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24(1) (1982)).
53. Id. at 817 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24(2) (1982)).
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Professor Trautman pointed out that this test would apply equally to
claims of both plaintiffs and defendants from the first action. If a
defendant failed to assert a compulsory counterclaim in the first action,
claim preclusion would bar a second action on that counterclaim. 54 A
compulsory counterclaim “arises out of the transaction or occurrence
that is the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim,” 55 a rule with an
obvious parallel to the Restatement’s transaction test for measuring
identity of claims. 56
3.

Identity of Persons and Parties

The third element of Washington’s four-part test for claim preclusion
makes a judgment binding on all parties to the litigation, as well as on all
those in privity with the parties.57 While party identity is relatively easy
to ascertain, Professor Trautman noted, Washington courts have found
the privity label more difficult to apply. 58 He found it most useful to
identify categories in which Washington courts had found privity, which
included successors in interest (e.g., land purchasers and assignees of
contract rights); 59 those persons whose interests are represented by a
party (e.g., corporation and stockholders, judgment creditor and debtor,
bankruptcy trustee and creditors); 60 nonparties who control the prior
litigation; 61 and nonparties who participate in the previous litigation,
including, most expansively, a person who testified as a witness in the
case. 62
54. Trautman, supra note 1, at 818.
55. WASH. SUPER. CT. R. CIV. P. 13(a).
56. Professor Trautman also explained that the same result would be reached with regard to
transactionally-related counterclaims, whether through claim preclusion or through direct reliance
on Rule 13(a) itself. “Regardless of the theory, preclusion should follow, as any other result would
defeat the purpose of the compulsory provision.” Trautman, supra note 1, at 819.
57. Id. at 819 (citing Puget Sound Gillnetters Ass’n v. Moos, 92 Wash. 2d 939, 953, 603 P.2d
819, 826 (1979)).
58. Id. at 819.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 819–20.
61. Id. at 820 (citing Mut. of Enumclaw Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 37 Wash.
App. 690, 693, 682 P.2d 317, 319 (1984) (precluding insurer that took over defense of its insured in
prior case)).
62. Id. Professor Trautman noted that it was unclear whether these witnesses were actually found
to be in privity, but they were bound by the prior judgment in several Washington cases. Id. at 820
n.100 (citing Bacon v. Gardner, 38 Wash. 2d 299, 229 P.2d 523 (1951); Briggs v. Madison, 195
Wash. 612, 82 P.2d 113 (1938); Am. Bonding Co. v. Loeb, 47 Wash. 447, 92 P. 282 (1907); and
Shoemake v. Finlayson, 22 Wash. 12, 60 P. 50 (1900)). Precluding witnesses or participants if they
did not actually control the litigation had been criticized in 2 LEWIS H. ORLAND, WASHINGTON
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Identity of Quality of Persons

According to Professor Trautman, cases rarely turned on the fourth
element in the claim preclusion test: that there must be identity of the
quality of persons for or against whom the preclusion argument was
made. 63 Instead, analysis of that element tended to be paired with the
analysis of identity of parties, with both tests yielding the same result. 64
Consequently, there was scant guidance on this element in Washington
law. 65
This relatively useless, redundant element of the test 66 appears to have
led Professor Trautman to endorse a pragmatic, functional approach to
the quality of persons analysis, 67 just as he had recommended on the
identity of claim element. 68 He invoked as an example of this approach
the decision in Rains v. State. 69 Here, the Washington State Supreme
Court permitted defendants to benefit from claim preclusion, even
though the first suit was against named members of the state public
disclosure commission, while the second suit was instead against the
state and the commission. 70 The court decided that the suit against the
individual commissioners was “in reality a suit against the state,”
according to Professor Trautman. 71 He suggested that examining
substance over form in this pragmatic manner “potentially has a broader
application.” 72
5.

Final Judgment on the Merits

To be given preclusive effect, a judgment must be both final and on
the merits, in addition to satisfying the four identity elements.73
Although it is generally clear when a judgment is final, Professor
Trautman explained that Washington courts have been called upon to
resolve some ambiguous situations. For example, a court’s denial of a
PRACTICE SERIES, TRIAL PRACTICE § 373, at 415–16 (3d ed. 1972).
63. Trautman, supra note 1, at 821.
64. Id. at 820–21.
65. Id.
66. See infra notes 194–213 and accompanying text.
67. Trautman, supra note 1, at 821.
68. Id. at 817, 821.
69. Id. at 821 (citing Rains v. State, 100 Wash. 2d 660, 664, 674 P.2d 165, 169 (1983)).
70. Id. (citing Rains, 100 Wash. 2d at 664, 674 P.2d at 169).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 822.
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defense motion for summary judgment did not amount to a final
judgment when a plaintiff later voluntarily dismissed her claim and
brought a new lawsuit. 74 And no preclusion attached to a trial court
ruling that was intended to be interlocutory, such as an oral decision
announced while findings and conclusions were still being prepared. 75
Additionally, a pending appeal did not defer or negate the finality of an
otherwise final trial court decision—a difference between Washington
preclusion law and that of some other jurisdictions.76
Preclusion requires a final decision that also reached the merits of the
controversy, Professor Trautman observed. 77 For example, when an
action is dismissed because it was prematurely brought, no court
examines the merits and there is no preclusion of the claim when it is
brought at an appropriate time. 78 In contrast, when a court enters
judgment based on the parties’ consent or on a settlement, that judgment
is on the merits, and typically will preclude later actions on the claims
that were or should have been raised in the case. 79 Even a default
judgment is considered to be on the merits for claim preclusion
purposes. 80
Washington court rules can play a significant role in the “on the
merits” inquiry. A judgment based on a voluntary dismissal without
prejudice ordinarily does not have preclusive effect 81 unless the litigant
has previously dismissed an action that includes the same claim—in
which case it is considered an adjudication on the merits. 82 A judgment
based on involuntary dismissal would generally be considered on the
merits, unless the court specified to the contrary, or if the dismissal was
based on lack of jurisdiction, improper venue, or failure to join a
required party. 83 Professor Trautman noted that a judgment granting a

74. Id.
75. Id. (citing Westmoreland Co. v. Howell, 62 Wash. 146, 113 P. 281 (1911)).
76. Id. at 824.
77. Id. at 822.
78. Id. at 822–23.
79. Id. at 824.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 823.
82. Id. at 824 (citing WASH. SUPER. CT. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(4), which reads: “Unless otherwise
stated in the order of dismissal, the dismissal is without prejudice, except that an order of dismissal
operates as an adjudication upon the merits when obtained by a plaintiff who has once dismissed an
action based on or including the same claim in any court of the United States or of any state.”).
83. Id. at 824–25 (quoting WASH. SUPER. CT. R. CIV. P. 41(b)(3): “Unless the court in its order
for dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this subsection and any dismissal not provided
for in this rule, other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, for improper venue, or for failure to
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demurrer historically had been considered on the merits, and a dismissal
for failure to state a claim should likewise be considered on the merits. 84
6.

Character of the Tribunal

Professor Trautman explained that claim preclusion operates across
all levels of trial courts, allowing a judgment from a justice court (or its
modern descendent, a court of limited jurisdiction) to preclude a later
action in superior court. 85 Preclusive effect could be limited by the
court’s jurisdiction, though, either as to subject matter or monetary
limits. 86 Preclusion could also apply to judgments of administrative
agencies and arbitrators, if the body acted in a judicial or quasi-judicial
capacity. 87
Concluding his discussion of claim preclusion, Professor Trautman
described situations in which the “strong sentiment in favor of finality”
yielded to a concern with reaching a just result. 88 For example,
Washington courts have denied claim preclusion when the party to the
prior judgment was unable to appeal it, was unable to fully recover
because of an unripe claim, or was induced by fraud not to bring all
possible claims in the original action. 89 Avoiding injustice was the
common theme in the examples he cited, and he endorsed this
application of the doctrine: “[T]his is as it should be. Even at the
expense of some predictability, there will be instances when more
important policies should prevail than those supporting the claim
preclusion doctrine.” 90

join a party under rule 19, operates as an adjudication upon the merits.”).
84. Id. at 825 (citing WASH. SUPER. CT. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6), which reads: “Every defense . . . shall
be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except that the following defenses
may at the option of the pleader be made by motion: . . . (6) failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted . . . .”).
85. Id. at 825.
86. Id. at 826. Professor Trautman gave two examples. First, the superior court in an unlawful
detainer action has jurisdiction only over issues relating to the right to possession, so a later action
concerning the property is not precluded. Mead v. Park Place Props., 37 Wash. App. 403, 681 P.2d
256 (1984); Phillips v. Hardwick, 29 Wash. App. 382, 383, 628 P.2d 506, 507 (1981). Second, there
was no preclusion of a counterclaim that exceeded the monetary jurisdiction of a justice court and
could not be litigated in the first action. Centennial Flouring Mills Co. v. Schneider, 16 Wash. 2d
159, 167, 132 P.2d 995, 997 (1943).
87. Trautman, supra note 1, at 825–26.
88. Id. at 826–29.
89. Id. at 827.
90. Id. at 829.
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Issue Preclusion

The second preclusion doctrine that Professor Trautman examined
was issue preclusion—the rule that prevents parties from relitigating
issues already decided in a previous action.91 Washington courts ask four
questions when a party asserts issue preclusion: 92
(1) Was the issue decided in the prior adjudication identical with
the one presented in the action in question? (2) Was there a final
judgment on the merits? (3) Was the party against whom the
plea is asserted a party or in privity with a party to the prior
adjudication? (4) Will the application of the doctrine not work
an injustice on the party against whom the doctrine is to be
applied? 93
1.

Identical Issue

Because issue preclusion applies only to actually litigated issues, not
claims, the identical issue inquiry is central to most decisions, and
Professor Trautman offered an array of examples in which it was clear
that issues were the same or different.94 The more cloudy instances arise
when a verdict or judgment is ambiguous or indefinite, he said, and issue
preclusion will not be available in those cases. 95
An identical issue actually litigated is insufficient to justify issue
preclusion, however. 96 Professor Trautman emphasized that preclusive
effect should attach only to those issues that were “material and essential

91. Id.
92. Professor Trautman explained that, like claim preclusion, issue preclusion can apply to
decisions by administrative agencies acting in a judicial capacity, and to arbitrators’ awards. Id. at
829–30. Issue preclusion can also arise when a criminal prosecution is followed by a civil suit. For
example, a bank sued to recover money from defendants who had been convicted of embezzlement.
The court held the defendants properly precluded from relitigating the issue of embezzlement, since
they had been accorded the procedural protections of a criminal trial, including a burden of proof
higher than that in a civil action. Id. at 830 (citing Seattle-First Nat’l Bank v. Cannon, 26 Wash.
App. 922, 615 P.2d 1316 (1980)). Although he addressed the criminal-to-civil preclusion context,
Professor Trautman excluded from his article the use of claim or issue preclusion in a criminal
prosecution. Id. at 806, 830.
93. Id. at 831. Professor Trautman explained the relationship between claim and issue preclusion
this way: Claim preclusion is broader since it “bars an entire claim and not just a particular issue.”
Id. at 829. But issue preclusion has broader scope because it applies even when the two actions
involve different claims, as long as the issues are identical. Id.
94. Id. at 831–32.
95. Id. at 833.
96. Id. at 832.
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to the first controversy.” 97 An essential issue is likely to have received
the parties’ and judge’s attention in the first case, justifying preclusion in
the second. 98
According to Professor Trautman, one problematic aspect of
Washington cases on issue preclusion was the distinction drawn between
ultimate facts and evidentiary facts. 99 The courts applied preclusion to
ultimate facts—those directly at issue and upon which the claim rested
in the first case. But they did not preclude relitigation of evidentiary
facts—those that were contested and proven but were “merely collateral
to the claim asserted.” 100 After describing several examples of courts
applying the distinction, Professor Trautman observed that “the rationale
is stated largely in conclusory terms with little additional
explanation.” 101 The doctrine was flawed because it was difficult to
distinguish ultimate from evidentiary facts, and because sometimes
evidentiary facts indeed did receive the parties’ full attention, which
would justify preclusion. 102
Therefore, he advocated that courts abandon the ultimate fact
limitation of the old Restatement of Judgments in favor of the new
Restatement (Second) of Judgments. 103 This more modern take focused
the inquiry on “whether the issue was actually recognized by the parties
as important and by the judge as necessary to the first
judgment[] . . . [and] whether the significance of the issue for purposes
of the subsequent action was sufficiently foreseeable at the time of the
first action.” 104 This approach, Professor Trautman said, was clearer and
more meaningful, thus more useful for counsel in predicting results and
advising clients. 105
2.

Final Judgment
Professor Trautman advocated a “pragmatic, flexible” approach to the

97. Id. at 833 (citing East v. Fields, 42 Wash. 2d 924, 259 P.2d 639 (1953); Fies v. Storey, 37
Wash. 2d 105, 221 P.2d 1031 (1950)).
98. Id. (citing Dixon v. Fiat-Roosevelt Motors, 8 Wash. App. 689, 509 P.2d 86 (1973)).
99. Id. at 833–34.
100. Id. (noting that this approach was consistent with the Restatement of Judgments § 68
(1942)).
101. Id. at 834.
102. Id. at 835.
103. Id.
104. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 27 cmt. j, 28 (1982)).
105. Id.
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question of final judgment on the merits. 106 If the other three questions
are satisfied, he said, “a final adjudication of rights is more important
than a final decree.” 107
3.

Persons Bound

The general rule is that issue preclusion will bind only a party to the
previous action, or a person in privity with a party, regardless of whether
the party was a plaintiff or defendant.108 Occasionally, issue preclusion
has been denied between persons who were parties to both proceedings,
but were not adversaries in the first proceeding. 109 Professor Trautman
explained and approved of a trend in Washington courts to move away
from looking technically at adverseness, instead asking if the party to be
bound had “the motivation and the opportunity to present the case fully
and fairly in the first proceeding.” 110
After describing typical privity situations, Professor Trautman
examined some relatively rare situations in which a court bound a
nonparty. 111 As with claim preclusion, 112 a witness in the prior case can
be bound by the judgment. 113 In addition, Washington courts are willing
to bind nonparties who could not be joined as third-party defendants in
the first action, but were potentially liable for reimbursement or
indemnity of the defendant. 114 If a defendant in the first case gave proper
notice and tendered the third person the opportunity to defend, the third
person would be bound by the judgment. 115
106. Id. at 831.
107. Id. (citing Bull v. Fenich, 34 Wash. App. 435, 439, 661 P.2d 1012, 1014 (1983)).
108. Id. at 836.
109. Id. at 838.
110. Id. at 841 (citing Simpson Timber Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 19 Wash. App. 535,
576 P.2d 437 (1978)). Professor Trautman concluded that the adverseness requirement was
unsustainable now that nonmutual preclusion was available in Washington courts. Id. at 839.
111. Id. at 836–37.
112. See supra notes 61–62 and accompanying text.
113. Trautman, supra note 1, at 837. Professor Trautman described Hackler v. Hackler, 37 Wash.
App. 791, 683 P.2d 241 (1984), in which the court applied issue preclusion against a witness and his
wife, stating:
[C]ollateral estoppel does not apply to [the Hacklers] by reason of privity, as that concept is
usually understood. This, however, is not the end of the matter, because there is an exception to
the requirement that one be a party or in privity with a party to the prior litigation.
One who was a witness in an action, fully acquainted with its character and object and
interested in its results, is estopped by the judgment as fully as if he had been a party.
Trautman, supra note 1, at 837 n.208 (quoting Hackler, 37 Wash. App. at 795, 683 P.2d at 243).
114. Trautman, supra note 1, at 837.
115. Id. Professor Trautman explained that this “vouching in” doctrine was “somewhat out of the
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Finally, Professor Trautman described the Court’s very unusual
approach to binding a nonparty in Kyreacos v. Smith. 116 A Seattle police
detective was convicted of premeditated murder. 117 The victim’s widow
brought a wrongful death action against the detective and the City of
Seattle, claiming the city was liable under respondeat superior. 118 The
trial court granted summary judgment, dismissing the claim against the
City. 119 Affirming summary judgment, the Supreme Court held that a
conviction based on premeditated murder conclusively established that
the detective was acting outside the scope of his employment, and not on
behalf of his employer. 120 The court acknowledged the lack of privity
between the widow and the parties in the first case, but decided
preclusion would not work an injustice. 121 It stated that “allowing
relitigation of the character of the act of murder would be an absurd
result under the facts and pleadings of this case,” when twelve jurors had
already been convinced that the murder was premeditated, when the
plaintiff had chosen to name the detective as a defendant in the civil
case, and when the plaintiff’s non-participation in the criminal trial
could not be prejudicial. 122 Professor Trautman observed that the holding
“cannot be explained by the ordinary principles of collateral estoppel,
nor by recognized exceptions.” 123 He agreed with the court’s own
assessment that this was “a most unique case which must be confined to
its peculiar facts and to its procedural posture.” 124
4.

Doing Justice

The last question a court will ask is whether issue preclusion “will
work an injustice on the party against whom the doctrine is invoked.” 125
In this context, Professor Trautman explained the relatively recent
ordinary.” For additional detail, see 18A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD
COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, JURISDICTION AND RELATED MATTERS § 4452 (2d
ed. 2014) (noting doctrine’s redundancy in light of modern interpleader rules).
116. Trautman, supra note 1, at 837–38 (citing Kyreacos v. Smith, 89 Wash. 2d 425, 428, 572
P.2d 723, 724 (1977)).
117. Kyreacos, 89 Wash. 2d at 426, 572 P.2d at 723.
118. Trautman, supra note 1, at 837–38 (citing Kyreacos, 89 Wash. 2d at 428, 572 P.2d at 724).
119. Id. at 838.
120. Id. (citing Kyreacos, 89 Wash. 2d at 427, 572 P.2d at 724).
121. Id. (citing Kyreacos, 89 Wash. 2d at 428, 572 P.2d at 724).
122. Kyreacos, 89 Wash. 2d at 428, 572 P.2d at 724–25.
123. Trautman, supra note 1, at 838.
124. Id. (quoting Kyreacos, 89 Wash. 2d at 428, 572 P.2d at 724).
125. Id. at 839.
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erosion of the mutuality doctrine in Washington. 126 The old rule was that
“just as a stranger was not bound by a judgment, likewise the stranger
should not be permitted to benefit. The estoppel had to be mutual.”127
But in the 1970s, Washington courts began to allow strangers to the first
action to invoke issue preclusion for defensive purposes,128 and later,
allowed a stranger to benefit through offensive use of issue
preclusion. 129 While there was ample authority rejecting the mutuality
requirement, Professor Trautman pointed out that specific contours of
nonmutual estoppel remained to be worked out in greater detail. 130 The
“vital concern is whether the person who will be bound had the
motivation and the opportunity to present the case fully and fairly in the
first proceeding”—essentially, whether issue preclusion “in favor of a
stranger [would] work an injustice.” 131
Apart from mutuality, cases turning on the injustice element of the
issue preclusion test involved diverse factors. Courts considered issues
such as whether the first judgment could be appealed, factual changes
since the first action, potential for confusing a jury, manifest error in the
first determination of the issue, whether the issues had been fairly and
fully litigated, and whether preclusion would work a “patent
injustice.” 132 Professor Trautman concluded his article by endorsing the
flexibility the injustice prong injected into the doctrine:
There is danger that in seeking to relieve the crowded dockets
and backlog of litigation, courts will too readily turn to the rules
of res judicata and collateral estoppel. It is critical to remember
that the doctrines of claim and issue preclusion are court-created
concepts. Accordingly, they can be adjusted to accommodate
whatever considerations are necessary to achieve the final
126. Id. at 839–41.
127. Id. at 839.
128. Id. at 840 (citing Lucas v. Velikanje, 2 Wash. App. 888, 471 P.2d 103 (1970) (following
failed first suit to set aside trust for fraud, court precluded plaintiff’s malpractice suit against a new
defendant, an attorney, for failing to discover the fraud)).
129. Id. at 841 (citing Seattle-First Nat’l Bank v. Cannon, 26 Wash. App. 922, 615 P.2d 1316
(1980) (bank in civil action allowed to benefit from preclusion based on conviction of defendant in
prior criminal case)). A landmark federal case on non-mutual offensive issue preclusion had quite
recently paved the way for this shift in Washington law that Professor Trautman described. In
Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979), the Supreme Court allowed a “stranger” to
rely on issue preclusion. After a successful SEC action against the defendant, plaintiffs were
allowed to benefit from the SEC’s success when they brought a securities fraud stockholder’s class
action suit against the same defendant. See id. at 332–33.
130. Trautman, supra note 1, at 841.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 841–42.
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objective—doing justice. 133
II.

PROFESSOR TRAUTMAN’S ARTICLE IN THE COURTS

The legacy of Professor Trautman’s work on preclusion is impossible
to assess with precision, but the fact that Washington courts and
practitioners have been citing it for thirty years is significant in itself.
Lawyers cite it frequently to Washington courts, 134 and courts often rely
on it to lay out the basic tests for claim or issue preclusion. 135 Less
frequently, courts have directly responded to Professor Trautman’s
suggestions, or acted in ways relevant to his core recommendations; Part
II addresses those cases. In many ways, Washington law has developed
consistently with Professor Trautman’s vision of a pragmatic approach
to preclusion law. Examples of these developments are examined in
Section A, infra. However, some of the professor’s innovative
recommendations have not received the attention they deserve. The test
for claim preclusion, for example, continues to be messy and inefficient,
as will be discussed in Section B, infra. The current formulation of the
test is not an effective screening tool for claim preclusion, and it should
be revised. Professor Trautman’s call for clear and usable rules of claim
preclusion is just as important now as it was three decades ago, and a
solution is still within reach.
A.

Pragmatic Approach to Preclusion Law

Thirty years of Washington case law suggest that many appellate
judges agree with Professor Trautman’s endorsement of a pragmatic
approach to preclusion law. But as a threshold matter, courts in
Washington continue to use the res judicata and collateral estoppel
terminology, despite Professor Trautman’s recommendation, and even
though the terms continue to confuse.136 Apparently the battle over
133. Id. at 842.
134. As of February 27, 2015, Westlaw indicates that the article has been cited in at least 162
documents filed by litigants in state and federal trial courts (includes documents filed since 1997)
and appellate courts (includes documents filed since 1990).
135. E.g., Mut. of Enumclaw Ins. Co. v. T&G Constr., Inc., 165 Wash. 2d 255, 263, 199 P.3d
376, 381 (2008); Christensen v. Grant Cnty. Hosp. Dist. No. 1, 152 Wash. 2d 299, 306, 96 P.3d 957,
961 (2004); Lenzi v. Redland Ins. Co., 140 Wash. 2d 267, 280, 996 P.2d 603, 609 (2000).
136. See, e.g., Hisle v. Todd Pac. Shipyards Corp., 151 Wash. 2d 853, 865 n.9, 93 P.3d 108, 114
n.9 (2004) (clarifying that defendant raised a res judicata defense, not collateral estoppel, and stating
“[w]e must be vigilant in preserving the distinction between these two defenses”); Lenzi, 140 Wash.
2d at 280, 966 P.2d at 609 (reframing case to apply res judicata, not collateral estoppel as the
defendant had argued); Kelly-Hansen v. Kelly-Hansen, 87 Wash. App. 320, 328, 941 P.2d 1108,
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terminology is not over: usage can vary from judge to judge, and even
within a single decision. 137
During this period, though, Washington courts often have followed
Professor Trautman’s advice by emphasizing that the binding effect of a
prior judgment should depend to a great extent on whether a party had
the incentive and opportunity to litigate claims or issues in the first case.
For example, as the courts continued to craft rules for claim and issue
preclusion based on decisions of non-judicial tribunals, they have
carefully examined features Professor Trautman highlighted. 138
Washington courts heed his advice by considering how procedural
differences between administrative agencies and courts can affect
fairness, incentive to litigate, and opportunity to litigate claims and
issues. 139 Courts consider the same questions of fairness, incentive and
opportunity when deciding whether to accord preclusive effect to
decisions from judicial tribunals that have limited jurisdiction, or operate
under less formal procedures. For example, these questions are
important when the original judgment is from a small claims court,140 or

1112 (1997) (explaining dual meaning of term “res judicata”).
137. For example, the majority analyzed res judicata and the dissent analyzed claim preclusion in
Hayes v. City of Seattle, 131 Wash. 2d 706, 934 P.2d 1179, opinion corrected, 943 P.2d 265 (1997).
138. See Trautman, supra note 1, at 829–30.
139. E.g., Christensen, 152 Wash. 2d at 313, 96 P.3d at 964 (“There is nothing inherently unfair
about [issue preclusion based on administrative agency findings] provided the party has the full and
fair opportunity to litigate, there is no significant disparity of relief, and all the other requirements of
collateral estoppel are satisfied.”); Reninger v. State Dep’t of Corr., 134 Wash. 2d 437, 454, 951
P.2d 782, 791 (1998) (finding no injustice in applying issue preclusion where parties “displayed no
lack of incentive to litigate” in prior administrative forum); Shoemaker v. City of Bremerton, 109
Wash. 2d 504, 508–09, 745 P.2d 858, 861 (1987) (applying RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
JUDGMENTS § 83 (1982) to evaluate procedural differences); see also Carver v. State, 147 Wash.
App. 567, 574–75, 197 P.3d 678, 682 (2008) (finding that injustice element of issue preclusion
includes both procedural and substantive unfairness).
140. E.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Avery, 114 Wash. App. 299, 57 P.3d 300 (2002). In
this case involving a small claims court judgment, the court laid out factors to consider in evaluating
whether preclusion will serve the ends of justice: character of the court, scope of its jurisdiction,
procedural informality, and procedural safeguards, including opportunity to appeal. Id. at 306–09,
57 P.3d at 304–06. The court cited Professor Trautman in support of its conclusion that the
“judgment of any court at any level may preclude further litigation.” Id. at 306, 57 P.3d 304
(emphasis in original) (citing Trautman, supra note 1, at 825). The court concluded that small
claims courts have jurisdiction over contract disputes—including the issue decided in this case—
and that the amount in controversy limit was met. Id. at 308, 57 P.3d at 305. Concerning procedural
informality, the court rejected State Farm’s argument that it did not receive a full and fair
opportunity to litigate the issue because it was not allowed to be represented by counsel in the small
claims court. Id. at 309, 57 P.3d at 305–06; see also WASH. REV. CODE § 12.40.080 (2014). Having
received adequate notice of the action, State Farm should have been alerted to the implications of
the claim, so the procedures satisfied due process. Ultimately, though, the court agreed with State
Farm that preclusion would be unjust in this situation because there was no right to appeal unless
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a district court that handles traffic infractions.141
The pragmatic approach is further illustrated by the courts’
increasingly flexible view of finality, as advocated by Professor
Trautman. 142 For example, when a litigant argued that partial summary
judgment was not a final judgment for issue preclusion purposes, the
Washington Court of Appeals responded:
We recently rejected a similar argument on the ground that such
a rigorous finality requirement does not implement the purposes
of collateral estoppel: to protect prevailing parties from
relitigating issues already decided in their favor, and to promote
judicial economy. Chau [v. City of Seattle], 60 Wash. App. 115,
120–21, 802 P.2d 822 (1991). With Chau, this court aligned
itself with the majority of courts which employ a pragmatic
approach to determine finality for purposes of collateral
estoppel. 143
the amount in controversy exceeded $250. Avery, 114 Wash App. at 309, 57 P.3d 306 (citing
Trautman, supra note 1, at 827) (“[W]e will not deny a party the chance to litigate the issue if it was
statutorily denied an opportunity to appeal.”); see also WASH. REV. CODE § 12.40.120.
141. E.g., Hadley v. Maxwell, 144 Wash. 2d 306, 27 P.3d 600 (2001). A defendant who lost and
did not appeal from a traffic citation later faced a negligence suit by the driver of the other vehicle
involved in an auto accident. The trial court precluded her from arguing issues established in traffic
court. On appeal, the Washington State Supreme Court emphasized that the party to be precluded
must have had an incentive and opportunity to vigorously litigate in the first case, and “interests at
stake that would call for a full litigational effort.” Id. at 312, 27 P.3d at 602 (quoting 14 LEWIS H.
ORLAND & KARL B. TEGLAND, WASHINGTON PRACTICE SERIES, TRIAL PRACTICE, CIVIL § 373, at
763 (5th ed. 1996)). The driver’s incentive to litigate was low: ninety-five dollars was at risk. The
court concluded that issue preclusion is “not generally appropriate when there is nothing more at
stake than a nominal fine. There must be sufficient motivation for a full and vigorous litigation of
the issue.” Id. at 314, 27 P.3d at 604. The court also acknowledged that differences in the two
forums weighed against preclusion, and cautioned against shifting to traffic courts the job of
carefully weighing evidence that will later be determinative in a negligence action. Id. at 314 n.2, 27
P.3d at 603 n.2.
142. Trautman, supra note 1, at 831 (advocating a pragmatic, flexible application of final
judgment requirement).
143. Cunningham v. State, 61 Wash. App. 562, 566–67, 811 P.2d 225, 228 (1991) (citing 18
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE, JURISDICTION AND RELATED MATTERS § 4434, at 321 (1981) (noting that the strict
finality requirement has been relaxed in recent decisions in favor of a practical view of finality)); 1B
JAMES MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 0.441[4], at 745 (1983) (“[T]here has been an increasing
judicial intolerance with efforts to avoid decisions made after fair consideration by shifting the
scene to another courtroom.”). In Chau, cited in Cunningham, the court took an impressively
pragmatic approach when a jury was deadlocked on liability but rendered a partial verdict on the
amount of damages. This decision was final, for all practical purposes, according to the court:
If the City chooses not to appeal, the judgment would become final. Hence, the finality
requirement of the damage award is satisfied. If the City appeals and prevails, it has not been
prejudiced by the application of collateral estoppel since it would have the opportunity to
relitigate damages. If the City loses the appeal, the judgment below is affirmed, and the finality
requirement of the damage award is again satisfied.
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Also as urged by Professor Trautman, Washington courts continued to
move away from reliance on formal “adverseness” as a determinative
factor in assessing which parties may be bound by preclusion. 144 Instead,
the emphasis is on more pragmatic considerations, such as limiting
preclusion between co-parties in order to avoid making cross-claims
effectively compulsory. 145
Another noteworthy development is the courts’ gradual move away
from the distinction between ultimate facts and evidentiary facts, and
between issues of fact and issues of law. As Professor Trautman
explained, the less modern approach denied issue preclusive effect to
evidentiary facts, and courts often found it difficult to sort ultimate and
evidentiary facts. 146 The modern view—represented by Restatement
(Second) of Judgments § 27—is to grant preclusive effect to issues of
both law and fact (whether evidentiary or ultimate fact), but only if the
parties recognized the issue’s importance in the prior litigation, and the

Chau v. City of Seattle, 60 Wash. App. 115, 121, 802 P.2d 822, 825 (1991).
144. See, e.g., Bunce Rental, Inc. v. Clark Equip. Co., 42 Wash. App. 644, 648 n.3, 713 P.2d 128,
131 n.3 (1986) (declining to require adverse relationship in prior action as long as precluded party
had “opportunity to fully and fairly present its case and will not be deprived of due process of law
by application of the doctrine”); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 38 cmt. a
(1982) (explaining that “determination of issues is not full and fair unless a party has an opportunity
to present proofs and argument specifically directed to the matters in controversy,” and that
preclusion can apply when “between defendants who are parties to a cross-claim, between a
defendant and an impleaded third-party defendant, and between parties who have been
interpleaded”).
145. See Krikava v. Webber, 43 Wash. App. 217, 716 P.2d 916 (1986). Here, the court held that
omitting a permissive cross-claim against a co-defendant would not trigger the rule against claimsplitting. A litigant asserted one cross-claim against a co-defendant, and preclusion would apply to
that entire claim. But she was not required to assert every possible cross-claim at the same time. To
hold otherwise would be inconsistent with Civil Rule 13(g), which makes cross-claims permissive.
Id. at 220–21, 716 P.2d 918–19. In dicta concerning issue preclusion, the court observed that if the
parties had litigated rather than settled the first case, issue preclusion would have been available
against the plaintiff in case two. “Co-parties who are not adversaries under the pleadings may be
considered adversaries with respect to issues actually litigated between them and the opposing party
in which the co-parties represented interests adverse to each other.” Id. at 221–22, 716 P.2d at 919
(emphasis in original) (citing 2 LEWIS H. ORLAND, WASHINGTON PRACTICE SERIES, TRIAL
PRACTICE § 373, at 417 (3d ed. 1972); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 38 cmt. a
(1982)).
146. As described in the Restatement (Second) of Judgments (1982),
[the old] formulation causes great difficulty, and is at odds with the rationale on which the rule
of issue preclusion is based. The line between ultimate and evidentiary facts is often impossible
to draw. Moreover, even if a fact is categorized as evidentiary, great effort may have been
expended by both parties in seeking to persuade the adjudicator of its existence or nonexistence
and it may well have been regarded as the key issue in the dispute. In these circumstances the
determination of the issue should be conclusive whether or not other links in the chain had to
be forged before the question of liability could be determined in the first or second action.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 cmt. j (1982).
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judge viewed it as necessary to the first judgment. 147 There has been no
formal adoption of this Restatement section, as Professor Trautman
urged, 148 and some cases continue to quote old language that includes
the “ultimate fact” terminology. 149 But courts seem to be progressing in
two ways on this point: first, by applying issue preclusion to issues both
of fact and of law, 150 and second, by examining whether the issue was
recognized as important—that its importance was foreseeable when the
first case was litigated. 151

147. Trautman, supra note 1, at 834 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 cmt. j,
§ 28 (1982)). Section 27 states that: “When an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and
determined by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, the
determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties, whether on the same or a
different claim.” See Chau, 60 Wash. App. at 119, 802 P.2d at 824 (quoting RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982), when analyzing finality of a partial verdict).
148. Trautman, supra note 1, at 835.
149. See, e.g., Williams v. Leone & Keeble, Inc., 171 Wash. 2d 726, 731, 254 P.3d 818, 821
(2011) (stating “Collateral estoppel . . . bars relitigation of issues of ultimate fact that have been
determined by a final judgment,” but not focusing on ultimate versus mediate fact distinction); State
v. Vasquez, 148 Wash. 2d 303, 308, 59 P.3d 648, 649 (2002) (same).
150. A recent federal court decision carefully examined the fact versus law question, and
predicted that Washington courts would likely endorse the use of issue preclusion on questions of
law as well as fact, following Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27 cmt. c. (1982). Seymour v.
PPG Indus., Inc., 891 F. Supp. 2d 721, 731–32 (W.D. Pa. 2012). The court described Franklin v.
Klundt, 50 Wash. App. 10, 746 P.2d 1228, 1230–31 (1987), which noted that issue preclusion
would apply to both issues of law and issues of fact, with a potential exception for “‘unmixed
questions of law’ arising in successive actions involving substantially unrelated claims.” The court
then explained that McDaniels v. Carlson, 108 Wash. 2d 299, 738 P.2d 254, 259 (1987), limited
issue preclusion to ultimate facts, not evidentiary facts that are collateral to the original claim, but
did so under the Restatement (First) of Judgments. The court concluded:
Recent case law suggests, and this court predicts, that the Supreme Court of Washington would
apply the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS. See, e.g., Lemond v. State, Dept. of
Licensing, 143 Wash. App. 797, 180 P.3d 829, 833 (2008) (applying RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF JUDGMENTS § 27); see also Phillip A. Trautman, Claim and Issue Preclusion in Civil
Litigation in Washington, 60 WASH. L. REV. 805 (1985) (urging Washington courts to adopt
the Second Restatement approach). Because section 27 of the Restatement (Second) of
Judgments applies collateral estoppel to issues “of fact or law,” PPG’s second argument is
without merit. Even if the Washington decision were made entirely on legal as opposed to
factual grounds, the determination could still be preclusive in this court, if the elements of issue
preclusion were met.
Seymour, 891 F. Supp. 2d at 731–32.
151. See In re Eleanor Lewis, No. H-614547, at 3 (Wash. Bd. Indus. Ins. App. July 2, 1990)
(adopting Professor Trautman’s recommendation to instead examine whether importance of issue
was foreseeable at time of earlier action); accord In re Keith O. Browne, No. W-929966, at 6–7
(Wash. Bd. Indus. Ins. App. June 4, 2007); see also Nielson By & Through Nielson v. Spanaway
Gen. Med. Clinic, Inc., 135 Wash. 2d 255, 262, 956 P.2d 312, 315 (1998) (providing section 27 as
“general rule” of issue preclusion, but not focusing on fact versus law distinction or on
foreseeability of issue’s importance); Lemond v. State, Dep’t of Licensing, 143 Wash. App. 797,
804, 180 P.3d 829, 833 (2008) (same).
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Claim Preclusion’s Overly Complex Test

In the decades since Professor Trautman’s article, Washington courts
have continued to use a test for claim preclusion that is more complex
than the test under federal law and the law of many other states.152
Recall that in Washington, a valid, final judgment on the merits
precludes litigation only if two successive proceedings are identical in
(1) subject matter, (2) cause of action, (3) persons and parties, and
(4) quality of persons for or against whom the claim is made. 153 A more
typical rule for claim preclusion outside of Washington is that a final
judgment on the merits precludes a new action involving the same
parties or their privies and “claims or defenses that were or could have
been raised in a prior proceeding.” 154
Professor Trautman’s article commented on the lack of judicial
guidance on two of the four elements: identical subject matter and
identical quality of persons for or against whom preclusion is asserted. 155
As Professor Trautman explained, these elements had not been of much
use to Washington courts. 156 Because they so significantly overlap with
identical cause of action and identical persons and parties, these
elements might sensibly have been allowed to wither away. But the
Washington State Supreme Court continues to emphasize that all four
elements must be satisfied in every claim preclusion case. 157
Accordingly, courts have dutifully marched through the four-element
test, and have even tried to differentiate and provide guidance on the two
redundant elements. 158 Despite these efforts, it is unclear whether any
case’s outcome has turned on one of these redundant elements in the last
thirty years. What is clear, however, is that the four-element test is more
cluttered than it needs to be, and that a simplified, two-part test would
provide a better screening mechanism for claim preclusion. This Section
will explain why.
The confusing picture is further complicated by the fact that the fourelement test for claim preclusion has nested within it a four-factor test
152. See GEOFFREY HAZARD, JOHN LEUBSDORF, & DEBRA BASSETT, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 14.3,
at 609 (6th ed. 2011).
153. See, e.g., Hisle v. Todd Pac. Shipyards Corp., 151 Wash. 2d 853, 865–66, 93 P.3d 108, 114–
15 (2004); see also discussion supra note 29 and accompanying text.
154. In re PCH Assoc., 949 F.2d 585, 594 (2d Cir. 1991).
155. Trautman, supra note 1, at 812–13, 820–21.
156. See discussion supra notes 30 & 31 and accompanying text.
157. Hisle, 151 Wash. 2d at 866, 93 P.3d at 115 (“[T]he res judicata test is a conjunctive one
requiring satisfaction of all four elements . . . .”).
158. See infra notes 167–171, 198–209 and accompanying text.
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through which courts evaluate element two: the requirement of an
identical cause of action. Illustrating the confusion that comes with an
eight-step analysis, the federal district courts lately have stumbled when
applying this aspect of Washington’s law of claim preclusion.
At least two recent federal district court decisions describe the fourelement test as a factor test, rather than the conjunctive elements test
mandated by Washington precedent. 159 The most recent decision said,
“Washington courts have applied these four factors in ‘a variety of
ways,’ and ‘it is not necessary that all four factors favor preclusion to bar
the claim.’” 160 This decision was based on an earlier decision that
incorrectly read Washington law, losing in translation the distinction
between the four-element test for claim preclusion and the four-factor
subtest for assessing identity of cause of action. 161 The earlier district
court decision mistook one test for the other when relying on a Ninth
Circuit opinion that correctly laid out the tests for claim preclusion in
Washington. 162 This line of cases illustrates a level of confusion that
could be easily resolved if the Washington courts were to simply use the
“transactional nucleus” test of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments
§ 24, 163 instead of the duplicative four-factor test. 164
1.

Identical Subject Matter

Professor Trautman expressed concern about the vague test for same
subject matter, 165 and the extent to which it was already covered by the
159. See Zweber v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 39 F. Supp. 3d 1161, 1166 (W.D. Wash.
2014); Smith v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. C12–1505–JCC, 2013 WL 1499265, at *4 n.1
(W.D. Wash. April 11, 2013).
160. Zweber, 39 F. Supp. 3d at 1166 (quoting Smith, 2013 WL 1499265, at *4 n.1).
161. See Smith, 2013 WL 1499265.
162. Smith mischaracterized what the Ninth Circuit said in Feminist Women’s Health Center v.
Codispoti, 63 F.3d 863, 867 (9th Cir. 1995). Referring to the “cause of action” factors under
Washington law, the Ninth Circuit stated:
Washington has applied the above criteria in a variety of ways, sometimes combining the
elements into one analysis, sometimes addressing all four factors, and other times focusing on
only one factor. See Claim and Issue Preclusion in Civil Litigation in Washington, Philip A.
Trautman, 60 WASH. L. REV. 805, 816 (1985). It is not necessary that all four factors favor
preclusion to bar the claim.
Id. The other four-part test—the one expressing the four identity elements for claim preclusion—
was discussed earlier on the same page of the Codispoti opinion. Id.
163. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24(1) (1982).
164. See infra notes 214–222 and accompanying text.
165. Courts and other commentators have expressed the same concern. See, e.g., Zweber, 39 F.
Supp. 3d at 1168 (quoting 14A KARL B. TEGLAND, WASHINGTON PRACTICE, CIVIL PROCEDURE
§ 35:25, at 526 (2d ed. 2009) (“The ‘same subject matter’ inquiry is somewhat vague, and
Washington courts have ‘seldom had occasion to discuss the requirement and its implications.’”).
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test for identity of cause of action. 166 Although one Washington State
Supreme Court opinion appeared to respond directly to the professor’s
concern, it did not remedy the problem of the duplicative test—a test
that would be unlikely to matter in all but the rarest cases. In Hayes v.
City of Seattle, 167 the Court decided that a prior action that sought to
nullify a city council decision on a master use permit should not
preclude a second action that sought damages for harm suffered as a
result of the same decision by the city council. 168 The Court explained:
We are satisfied that the two lawsuits with which we are here
concerned do not involve the same subject matter simply
because they both arise out of the same set of facts. . . . 169
While there is a dearth of case law defining when the subject
matter of cases differs, one noted authority has observed that
when courts examine subject matter “[t]he critical factors seem
to be the nature of the claim or cause of action and the nature of
the parties.” Philip A. Trautman, Claim and Issue Preclusion in
Civil Litigation in Washington, 60 WASH.L.REV. 805, 812–13
(1985). Examining the two actions that were brought by Hayes
in that light, we are satisfied that they do not deal with the same
subject matter. We reach that conclusion because the nature of
the two claims is entirely disparate. 170

166. Trautman, supra note 1, at 812–13.
167. 131 Wash. 2d 706, 712–13, 934 P.2d 1179, 1182 (1997).
168. Id.
169. Id. at 712, 934 P.2d at 1182. Justice Talmadge, dissenting, argued that the majority misused
precedent to come up with this incorrect premise that suits arising from the same set of facts do not
necessarily involve the same subject matter. Id. at 731, 934 P.2d at 1191 (Talmadge, J., dissenting).
The majority relied for this point on Mellor v. Chamberlin, 100 Wash. 2d 643, 646, 673 P.2d 610,
612 (1983), which involved a sale of property. The first lawsuit claimed that the sellers
misrepresented whether the property description included a parking lot. The second lawsuit alleged
breach of the covenant of title based on a neighbor’s encroachment. The court found both subject
matter and causes of action in the two cases were distinct, having only the underlying sale
transaction in common. The court also noted that “res judicata principles are less strictly adhered to
in the case of covenants of title,” and that the second claim was not ripe until after the first case
settled. Id. at 646, 673 P.2d at 612. Given the unusual circumstances in Mellor, it does appear that
the court in Hayes, and later in Hisle, may have attached undue significance to the idea that claims
“do not involve the same subject matter simply because they both arise out of the same set of facts.”
Hayes, 131 Wash. 2d at 712, 934 P.2d at 1182; see also Hisle v. Todd Pac. Shipyards Corp., 151
Wash. 2d 853, 866, 93 P.3d 108, 115 (2004). In a more typical situation, two lawsuits with claims or
causes of action that arise out of the same set of facts will qualify for claim preclusion between the
same parties.
170. Hayes, 131 Wash. 2d at 712–13, 934 P.2d at 1182; see also Marshall v. Thurston Cnty., 165
Wash. App. 346, 353, 267 P.3d 491, 495 (2011) (“Our Supreme Court has held that in determining
the identity of subject matter, ‘[t]he critical factors seem to be the nature of the claim or cause of
action and the nature of the parties.’” (quoting Hayes, 131 Wash. 2d at 712, 934 P.2d at 1179;
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The Hayes court went on to conclude that the two actions also involved
different causes of action, so preclusion did not turn on the same subject
matter element alone.171
Since Professor Trautman’s article, the Washington State Supreme
Court has issued three notable decisions that denied claim preclusion
based on only the same subject matter element. 172 In each instance, the
Court stopped its analysis before evaluating whether the two
proceedings also involved different claims or causes of action. 173 This is
logical, of course, because one missing element is fatal to the claim
preclusion defense. Unfortunately, the truncated analysis in each case
makes it impossible to know if the results would have been the same
under a simpler test that requires identity of cause of action, instead of
both cause of action and subject matter. But given the circumstances of
each case, to be described, infra, it appears quite likely that failure of
identity on the subject matter element would also result in failure of
identity on the cause of action element. And if that is true, then the more
streamlined test—the more commonly-used test that requires identity of
parties and causes of action—would properly screen cases such as these.
That streamlined test also would be simpler for litigants and courts,
resulting in increased efficiency in the judicial process.
The Washington State Supreme Court most recently relied on the
same subject matter element to reject a preclusion defense in a case
involving two successive judicial foreclosure proceedings; these actions
concerned the same property but different deeds of trust.174 The first
proceeding was a nonjudicial foreclosure, which was settled and
dismissed when the landowner agreed to sign a new deed of trust. The
stipulated order of dismissal included a statement that the property
would not be agricultural—non-agricultural status being essential to the
trustee’s right to foreclose the deed of trust nonjudicially. 175 When the
lender foreclosed on the new deed of trust, the landowner sued to
challenge the foreclosure and associated lending practices. In this action,
Trautman, supra note 1, at 812–13)).
171. Id.; see 14A TEGLAND, supra note 6, § 35:25 (describing Hayes).
172. Schroeder v. Excelsior Mgmt. Grp., LLC, 177 Wash. 2d 94, 297 P.3d 677 (2013); Gold Star
Resorts, Inc. v. Futurewise, 167 Wash. 2d 723, 222 P.3d 791 (2009); Hisle, 151 Wash. 2d 853, 93
P.3d 108.
173. Schroeder, 177 Wash. 2d 94, 297 P.3d 677; Gold Star Resorts, Inc., 167 Wash. 2d 723, 222
P.3d 791; Hisle, 151 Wash. 2d 853, 93 P.3d 108.
174. Schroeder, 177 Wash. 2d at 99–103, 108, 297 P.3d at 679–81, 684.
175. Id. at 100, 287 P.3d at 680. The Washington State Supreme Court found it “questionable
whether the trial court had authority to enter an order declaring whether the land would be used for
agricultural purposes at the time of a future sale.” Id. at 108, 287 P.3d at 684.
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the lender defended by asserting claim and issue preclusion. Its core
argument was that the landowner could not litigate the question whether
the property was agricultural, a point included in the stipulated
dismissal. 176
The Court decided that claim preclusion was not appropriate because
“[t]he subject matter of the 2009 litigation was the 2007 deed of trust.
The subject matter of the 2010 litigation was the foreclosure of the 2009
deed of trust.” 177 The Court declined to reach the issue preclusion
argument because the moving party had not analyzed the issue
preclusion elements, but it did note that the “issues in the two cases do
not appear to be identical.” 178 Once it had decided the subject matter of
the two actions differed, the Court did not reach the identical cause of
action element. 179 Because the two actions involved two different
plaintiffs, it is unlikely the two cases involved the same cause of action:
claim preclusion arose in the landowner’s suit against the lender, while
the prior case was a lender’s foreclosure against the landowner.
In another decision, the Court compared two cases and concluded that
the first “concerned the procedures used to adopt the new CBA
[collective bargaining agreement] and sought to invalidate [it],” while
the second action sought to apply the Minimum Wage Act to the CBA,
which was presumed valid. 180 “Because we find that identity of subject
matter does not exist, and because the res judicata test is a conjunctive
one requiring satisfaction of all four elements, we do not analyze the
other res judicata requirements.” 181 Given the nature of the two
proceedings, the case would almost certainly have failed the test for
identical cause of action—making the same subject matter test
unnecessary.
In the third decision, Gold Star Resorts, Inc. v. Futurewise, 182 the two
proceedings involved complex land use regulations: the second lawsuit
challenged a county’s failure to review and revise a comprehensive plan

176. Id. at 108, 297 P.3d at 684.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. See id.
180. Hisle v. Todd Pac. Shipyards Corp., 151 Wash. 2d 853, 866, 93 P.3d 108, 115 (2004).
181. Id. at 866, 93 P.3d at 115 (citing Hayes v. City of Seattle, 131 Wash. 2d 706, 712, 934 P.2d
1179, 1182, and citing Mellor v. Chamberlin, 100 Wash. 2d 643, 646, 673 P.2d 610 (1983), and
describing the case as “finding different subject matter in cases involving the sale of property where
the initial case sought to establish misrepresentation and the second case sought to establish a
breach of the covenant of title”).
182. 167 Wash. 2d 723, 222 P.3d 791 (2009).
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to bring it in compliance with the amended Growth Management Act. 183
In this lawsuit, the county asserted both claim and issue preclusion based
on an earlier proceeding that addressed the comprehensive plan as it
existed before the Growth Management Act was amended to provide for
a seven-year review period. 184 The Court analyzed both preclusion
defenses concurrently—examining the identical subject matter element
of claim preclusion and the identical issues element of issue
preclusion. 185 It found that because the earlier action “preceded the
County’s seven-year review, it did not (and could not) involve the same
subject matter and issues as the present case.”186 On this basis, the Court
denied both claim and issue preclusion, without further examining other
elements. 187 Had it examined the identical cause of action element, it
would likewise have found identity lacking, since the underlying legal
framework had changed significantly after the first lawsuit. 188
There is a scant authority in which the subject matter test is truly
outcome-determinative to the question of claim preclusion. 189 Although
183. Id. at 732, 222 P.3d at 796.
184. Id. at 732–33, 222 P.3d at 796.
185. Id. at 737–38, 222 P.3d at 798–99.
186. Id. at 738, 222 P.3d at 798.
187. Id. at 738, 222 P.3d at 799.
188. See id. at 738, 222 P.3d at 798–99.
189. Only one other recent published decision denied preclusion based on the subject matter test.
Hilltop Terrace Homeowner’s Ass’n v. Island Cnty., 126 Wash. 2d 22, 891 P.2d 29 (1995).
Although this case seems, at first glance, to turn on the subject matter test, it ultimately represents
the Washington State Supreme Court’s choice to graft preclusion law principles onto the writ
process for challenging quasi-judicial decisions by county commissioners. In Hilltop Terrace, the
Court reviewed the policies underlying preclusion, and then announced: “From these principles we
conclude that res judicata is applicable to the present administrative context, and stands for the
general proposition that there must be some limit to repeated submissions of applications involving
the same subject matter.” Id. at 31, 891 P.2d at 34. When a party makes successive applications for
conditional use permits (in this case, for cell-phone towers), these res judicata principles would bar
a second permit application if “there is an identity of subject matter between the first and second
applications.” Id. at 32, 891 P.2d at 35. More specifically, “a second application may be considered
if there is a substantial change in circumstances or conditions relevant to the application or a
substantial change in the application itself.” Id. at 33, 891 P.2d at 35; accord Davidson v. Kitsap
Cnty., 86 Wash. App. 673, 681–82, 937 P.2d 1309, 1314 (1997) (granting claim preclusion because
court found no substantial difference in plat applications filed for the same property four years
apart).
In effect, the Court in Hilltop Terrace used the “same subject matter” label as a way to implement
what it called a “general proposition” of limits on re-submission of applications. Hilltop Terrace,
126 Wash. 2d at 31, 891 P.2d at 34. A close reading of the decision suggests that this new rule
represents a departure from more traditional claim preclusion analysis—a decision to craft a
variation on claim preclusion that is suitable to the unique situation of permitting decisions by a
board of elected officials. Consequently, a more streamlined test for traditional claim preclusion
cases should not affect future situations that fall within the realm of quasi-judicial permitting
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it is not a dead letter, nor is the same subject matter test an especially
effective screening tool for claim preclusion: it is simply redundant to
the requirement that preclusion will apply only to the same claim or
cause of action. Now, as when Professor Trautman wrote about the
topic, most claim preclusion cases either turn on the identical cause of
action test alone, or fail both that element and the same subject matter
test. 190 Cases that satisfy all four elements of the claim preclusion test
tend to offer perfunctory discussion of the subject matter prong, or
simply collapse it into the cause of action test. 191 In the few cases that
fail the claim preclusion test solely because of non-identical subject
matter, the courts have not analyzed the identical cause of action
element—making it impossible to know whether the identical cause of
action test might have subsumed the same subject matter test.192 In other
words, there are no cases in which a court found two successive actions
satisfied the same cause of action element but failed the same subject
matter test.
Washington courts could easily restructure the claim preclusion test to
merge the same subject matter requirement into the same cause of action
requirement. Doing so would reflect the doctrinal reality of Washington
case law—what most courts are doing already—and would simplify the
analysis required of practitioners and courts alike. The change would
entail essentially no cost, as it is highly unlikely that a merged test would
fail to filter out instances in which a claim-preclusion defense should be
unavailable. 193

decisions.
190. See, e.g., Storti v. Univ. of Wash., 181 Wash. 2d 28, 40, 330 P.3d 159, 165 (2014) (denying
preclusion solely based on non-identical causes of action); Norco Constr., Inc. v. King Cnty., 106
Wash. 2d 290, 294–95, 721 P.2d 511, 513 (1986) (same); Hayes v. City of Seattle, 131 Wash. 2d
706, 712, 934 P.2d 1179, 1182–83 (1997) (failing on both elements); Richert v. Tacoma Power
Util., 179 Wash. App. 694, 707, 319 P.3d 882, 889 (2014), review denied sub nom. Richert v. City
of Tacoma, 337 P.3d 326 (Wash. Nov. 6, 2014) (failing on both elements).
191. See, e.g., Berschauer Phillips Constr. Co. v. Mut. of Enumclaw Ins. Co., 175 Wash. App.
222, 230, 308 P.3d 681, 685 (2013) (merging analysis of subject matter into cause of action
analysis); Karlberg v. Otten, 167 Wash. App. 522, 540, 280 P.3d 1123, 1133 (2012) (same); Ensley
v. Pitcher, 152 Wash. App. 891, 904–05, 222 P.3d 99, 105 (2009) (noting that court’s analysis of
identity of parties and claims “demonstrates that the subject matter of the first and second suits is
identical”); Garner v. City of Fed. Way, No. 65624–4–I, 2011 WL 2993287 (Wash. Ct. App. July
25, 2011) (unpublished).
192. See, e.g., Gold Star Resorts, Inc. v. Futurewise, 167 Wash. 2d 723, 738, 222 P.3d 791, 798–
99; Hisle v. Todd Pac. Shipyards Corp., 151 Wash. 2d 853, 866, 93 P.3d 108, 115 (2004).
193. This would not require courts to abandon the same subject matter test when considering
successive land use permit applications, using the rule developed in Hilltop Terrace. See supra note
189.
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“Quality of the Persons” Test

Courts have heeded Professor Trautman’s point that “[o]nly if there is
identity of parties, including the privity concept, need one consider the
fourth element, identity in the quality of the persons for or against whom
the claim is made.” 194 But rarely have courts encountered situations that
warranted serious analysis of the point, instead simply concluding that
identity of parties satisfied the quality of persons element, 195 or
collapsing the two elements into one test. 196 In practical terms,
abandoning the quality of persons element would reflect how
Washington courts tend to analyze claim preclusion. Any additional
information to be gained by scrutinizing this element is minimal at best,
and would be supplied in any event by carefully analyzing the elements
requiring identical parties and claims.
Only a few decisions have applied the quality of persons test
precisely, and have illuminated the requirement somewhat.197 Yet even
these decisions illustrate that Washington courts do not encounter
serious arguments that make the quality of persons element meaningful.
In the most recent decision, a plaintiff conceded that both of its
lawsuits involved identical parties, but argued it was “acting in a
different capacity or ‘quality’ in the lawsuits.” 198 The plaintiff, a
contractor, first obtained a default judgment against a subcontractor
insured by the defendant. 199 The contractor then pursued collection of
the judgment from the insurer through a “chose in action” theory in
Thurston County. 200 Unsuccessful there, it filed a direct action lawsuit in
King County, and the insurer asserted a claim preclusion defense based
on the Thurston County action. 201 The court of appeals explained that
194. See Landry v. Luscher, 95 Wash. App. 779, 785, 976 P.2d 1274, 1278 (1999) (quoting
Trautman, supra note 1, at 820).
195. See, e.g., Pederson v. Potter, 103 Wash. App. 62, 73, 11 P.3d 833, 838 (2000) (“Because the
parties are identical, the quality of the persons is also identical.”).
196. See, e.g., Kuhlman v. Thomas, 78 Wash. App. 115, 121–22, 897 P.2d 365, 368–69 (1995)
(evaluating successive suits against employer and employee, finding privity, and concluding
“parties must therefore be viewed as sufficiently the same, if not identical”); Carlson v. Staley, No.
62222–6–I, 2010 WL 703142 (Wash. Ct. App. Mar. 1, 2010) (unpublished) (merging identity and
quality tests).
197. See, e.g., Berschauer Phillips Constr. Co. v. Mut. of Enumclaw Ins. Co., 175 Wash. App.
222, 231, 308 P.3d 681, 685 (2013); Ensley v. Pitcher, 152 Wash. App. 891, 905–06, 222 P.3d 99,
106 (2009), review denied, 168 Wash. 2d 1028 (2010); Landry, 95 Wash. App. 779, 976 P.2d 1274.
198. Berschauer Phillips, 175 Wash. App. at 231, 308 P.3d at 685.
199. Id. at 224, 308 P.3d at 682.
200. Id. at 225–26, 308 P.3d at 682–83.
201. Id. at 225–27, 308 P.3d at 682–83. The “chose in action” suit sought to attach claims that the
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“[t]he quality of persons or parties is relevant in situations where the
parties to two lawsuits are the same, but one or the other acts in a
different capacity in the two proceedings.” 202 The court concluded that
the plaintiff’s “capacity” had not changed from one suit to the next: the
contractor “acted in its own capacity against [the insurer] and sought to
advance and protect its own interests in both lawsuits. These
considerations support the application of res judicata in these
circumstances.” 203
In Ensley v. Pitcher, 204 the court rejected an argument that the
defendants in two suits were qualitatively different. 205 A victim of a car
crash caused by a drunk driver brought an “over-service” claim first
against a bar, and later, the bartender who served the driver. 206 The court
of appeals held that the subject matter and claim were identical in both
suits, and that the employer (bar) and employee (bartender) were in
privity, satisfying the identical parties element of claim preclusion. 207
The fourth element, the court said,
simply requires a determination of which parties in the second
suit are bound by the judgment in the first suit. See 14A KARL
B. TEGLAND, WASHINGTON PRACTICE: CIVIL PROCEDURE
§ 35.27, at 464 (1st ed. 2007) (explaining that the “identity and
quality of parties” requirement is better understood as a
determination of who is bound by the first judgment—all parties
to the litigation plus all persons in privity with such parties). 208
Applying this test, the court found that the employer would be bound
because it was vicariously liable for the bartender’s actions; therefore,
the court found the quality of persons identical. 209 In other words, the
subcontractor might have had against the insurer, although the court pointed out that these claims
were “anything but certain.” Id. at 226 n.4, 308 P.3d at 682 n.4.
202. Id. at 231, 308 P.3d at 685 (citing Flessher v. Carstens Packing Co., 96 Wash. 505, 165 P.
397 (1917) (“[F]ather sued as guardian ad litem for his daughter based on injuries to her, and then
later sued to recover expenses he incurred providing medical care of the child.”)).
203. Id. at 231, 308 P.3d at 685; see Landry v. Luscher, 95 Wash. App. 779, 785, 976 P.2d 1274,
1278 (1999) (concluding that identical parties were qualitatively the same because they were in
adversarial posture in both actions).
204. 152 Wash. App. 891, 222 P.3d 99 (2009).
205. Id. at 905–06, 222 P.3d at 106.
206. Id. at 894, 222 P.3d at 100.
207. Id. at 906–07, 222 P.3d at 106.
208. Id. at 905, 222 P.3d at 106; accord Martin v. Wilbert, 162 Wash. App. 90, 97, 253 P.3d 108,
111 (2011) (adopting Ensley’s approach: “For the persons for or against whom the claim is made to
be of the same quality, the parties in the collateral action must be bound by the judgment in the prior
proceeding.”).
209. Ensley, 152 Wash. App. at 905–06, 222 P.3d at 106 (relying on RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
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employer-employee relationship satisfied two elements: identity of
parties and identical quality of persons.
It is nearly impossible to envision a situation in which the identical
quality of persons element could change the outcome in a case. 210
Consider the two scenarios in which quality of persons might be argued.
First, a defendant who raises a preclusion defense based on privity might
face an argument that he is a qualitatively different person from the
defendant in the prior case (as in Ensley). Second, like the contractor in
Berschauer Phillips¸ a plaintiff bringing a second lawsuit against the
same parties may argue against preclusion because it is acting in a
qualitatively different posture in the second lawsuit. 211 In both scenarios,
the quality of persons analysis is amply covered by the two key elements
in the identity inquiry: identity of parties and identity of claims. The
quality of persons element merely adds an extra step that is not essential
to properly analyzing a claim preclusion defense.
JUDGMENTS § 51 (1982) (“Parties and Other Persons Affected by Judgments”), which explains the
preclusive effect of a judgment against a party in a vicarious liability situation); accord Pinney v.
Belfore USA Grp., Inc., No. 71037–1–I, 2014 WL 5339542, at *5 (Wash. Ct. App. Oct. 20, 2014)
(unpublished) (“The final element of res judicata requires a determination of which parties in the
second suit are bound by the judgment in the first suit.” (citing Ensley, 152 Wash. App. at 905, 222
P.3d at 106 (2009)).
210. There is limited value in the two examples courts cite as possibly turning on the quality of
persons element. One is a 1917 case that appears completely unrelated to this element. In this case,
a father sued as guardian ad litem for his injured daughter, and later sued to recover expenses he
incurred taking care of her. Flessher v. Carstens Packing Co., 96 Wash. 505, 165 P. 397 (1917),
cited by Berschauer Phillips Constr. Co. v. Mut. of Enumclaw Ins. Co., 175 Wash. App. 222, 231,
308 P.3d 681, 685 (2013). The court did not analyze either identity of parties or their quality;
instead, it focused on whether the child and parent had separate causes of action, and concluded
they did. Flessher, 96 Wash. at 509, 165 P. at 398–99 (“[W]hen a minor is injured, two causes of
action arise, one in favor of the minor for pain and suffering and permanent injury, the other in
favor of the parent for loss of services during minority and expenses of treatment. These actions
may be joined or tried separately.”). The more modern case, Mellor v. Chamberlin, 100 Wash. 2d
643, 646, 673 P.2d 610, 612 (1983), involved a first action for a seller’s misrepresentation in a
description of property being sold, and a second action for breach of covenant of title. The Court
concluded that the parties were identical, but their “quality” differed when the plaintiff’s “causes of
action changed from misrepresentation to breach of covenant of title.” Id. Because the situation also
failed the requirement of identical cause of action and subject matter, the difference in quality of
persons seemed to be a natural extension of the fact that there were distinct causes of action.
211. This scenario might also be illustrated by a case that briefly dealt with the quality of persons
element, Camer v. Seattle School District No. 1, 52 Wash. App. 531, 762 P.2d 356 (1988). In its
third suit against the Seattle School District, a family added a third child as plaintiff. The court
approved claim preclusion and dismissed the family’s case, finding identical causes of action and
evaluating simultaneously the identity of parties and quality of the persons elements. The court held
“the quality of the plaintiff is the same in both cases. See Rains v. State, 100 Wash. 2d 660, 664, 674
P.2d 165 (1983) . . . . Finally, the persons against whom the claim is made, the District,
administrators, and teachers are qualitatively the same parties for purposes of applying the doctrine
of res judicata.” Id. at 535, 762 P.2d at 359.
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If the quality of persons question turns on who would be bound by the
first action, as in Ensley, that consideration is covered already by the
identity of parties element. The only nonparties who can be bound by
claim preclusion are those in some sort of legal relationship with a true
party, and courts must evaluate privity and agency theories when
determining whether there is an identity of parties. 212 An affirmative
answer to the identical parties element seems to also require an
affirmative answer to the quality of persons element. In this context, the
quality of persons test adds no value to the analysis, while making it
needlessly complex.
In the case of a plaintiff arguably suing in a different capacity, like the
contractor in Berschauer Phillips, its different capacity will hinge on the
core inquiry in any claim preclusion case: whether the plaintiff’s claims
or causes of action in the two proceedings are identical. In a case like
Berschauer Phillips, the court needed only to determine that the
contractor was pursuing the same claim (collection of a judgment)
against the same insurer in two different courts. By deciding that, it
followed that the identical quality of persons test was satisfied.
Conversely, a plaintiff bringing a distinct cause of action would also be
acting in a different capacity. The quality of persons test adds no value
to the analysis in either situation, yet increases complexity.
The core elements of claim preclusion—identical parties and identical
causes of action—sufficiently capture any situation in which a difference
in quality of persons would otherwise defeat preclusion. When given the
opportunity, the Washington State Supreme Court should not shy away
from reframing the test for claim preclusion by removing the redundant
requirement of identical quality of persons. Preclusion doctrine will be
clearer and easier to apply, with no cost in terms of fairness to parties. 213

212. See Ensley, 152 Wash. App. at 905–06, 222 P.3d at 106.
213. There is another possible solution to the redundant element, but it is perhaps too radical a
proposition in light of the Washington courts’ tenacious adherence to the quality of persons test.
The quality of persons issue tends to arise when a nonparty to the first case is a defendant in the
second, and wants to benefit from preclusion—such as when a related party has already defeated the
same plaintiff on the same claim, as in Ensley v. Pitcher, see supra notes 204–209, and Rains v.
State, see supra notes 69–71. This new party, a “stranger” to the first action, could perhaps rely on
issue preclusion because Washington law allows nonmutual issue preclusion in a stranger’s favor.
But for claim preclusion, mutuality is still required. Washington could follow the lead of other
jurisdictions that now allow nonmutual defensive claim preclusion in limited situations—those
involving a close or significant relationship between defendants in the first action and defendants in
the second action who are asserting claim preclusion against the same plaintiff.
There are well-developed standards for assessing whether nonmutual preclusion is appropriate,
and this approach could replace the quality of persons test very effectively. See 47 AM. JUR. 2D
Judgments § 577 and cases cited therein; Silva v. City of New Bedford, 660 F.3d 76, 80 (1st Cir.
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Testing Identity of Claim or Cause of Action

Another aspect of the claim preclusion test merits attention but has
been less problematic in Washington courts: how to evaluate the scope
of a claim or cause of action. Professor Trautman advocated that the
Washington courts adopt an important provision of the Restatement
(Second) of Judgments: the “transactional nucleus of facts” test to
determine the scope of a claim or cause of action for claim-splitting
purposes. 214 This test would extend claim preclusion to all “rights . . . to
remedies . . . with respect to all or any part of the transaction, or series of
connected transactions, out of which the action arose.” 215 Although some
courts appear open to this recommendation, there remains a problem of
courts applying four factors to answer the same question216 when only
one is necessary. Clarity and efficiency would be improved if the
Washington State Supreme Court were to simply adopt the transactional
nucleus of facts test.
The Washington State Supreme Court has not formally adopted the
transactional nucleus test from Restatement § 24, but has endorsed it as

2011); In re El San Juan Hotel Corp., 841 F.2d 6, 10 (1st Cir. 1988); but see 18A WRIGHT, MILLER,
& COOPER, supra note 115, § 4464.1 (noting non-mutual claim preclusion is appropriate in only
limited situations).
A Washington case that theoretically could have been analyzed under the nonmutual claim
preclusion doctrine is Feature Realty, Inc. v. Kirkpatrick & Lockhart Preston Gates Ellis, LLP, 161
Wash. 2d 214, 164 P.3d 500 (2007). Here, a new defendant in a lawsuit was allowed to benefit from
preclusion based on his law firm’s involvement in a previous suit by the same plaintiff. The court
concluded that the lawyer and his firm were “substantially the same” party, and thus the newcomer
could rely on the “two-dismissal rule” under Washington Civil Rule 41. Id. at 224, 164 P.3d at 505.
In a situation like this, nonmutual claim preclusion would likewise have allowed the newcomer to
benefit from his firm’s status, without requiring the court to analyze specifics of their relationship.
Arguably, nonmutual defensive claim preclusion would involve a simpler analysis than requiring
courts to scrutinize the privity issue in order to decide whether the parties and quality of persons
were identical in both suits.
214. See Trautman, supra note 1, at 817–18.
215. Id.; see supra notes 50–53 and accompanying text.
216. This test examines:
(1) whether rights or interests established in the prior judgment would be destroyed or impaired
by prosecution of the second action; (2) whether substantially the same evidence is presented
in the two actions; (3) whether the two suits involve infringement of the same right; and (4)
whether the two suits arise out of the same transactional nucleus of facts.
Rains v. State, 100 Wash. 2d 660, 664, 674 P.2d 165, 168 (1983). Notably, when the Washington
State Supreme Court in Rains borrowed this test from federal law, it omitted a crucial statement:
“The last of these criteria is the most important.” See Costantini v. Trans World Airlines, 681 F.2d
1199, 1202 (9th Cir. 1982). Because Washington courts commonly rely on Rains for the four-factor
test for identical cause of action, it would be sensible for courts to consider that the original source
gave special status to the transactional test.
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one way to determine the scope of a claim. 217 And Washington courts
have used the transactional nucleus of facts test with some
regularity 218—most recently in Storti v. University of Washington, 219 in
which the Supreme Court held that two lawsuits several years apart
involved different claims based on separate facts and evidence.220 One
court of appeals decision illustrates well the influence of Professor
Trautman’s recommendation to use Restatement § 24. 221 The court in
Hadley v. Cowan 222 explained how the transactional test applied to its
claim-splitting analysis:
The allegations of undue influence, abuse of confidence, fraud,
and substitution of respondents’ will for the deceased’s will all
are of a single “transactional nucleus of facts” that could and
should have been determined in the probate challenge. The
damages . . . are substantially the same and are intimately related
in time, origin, and motivation, because they arise out of the
same interactions between the deceased and the respondents. It
is also obvious that the claims in the present proceedings would
have constituted a convenient trial unit in the probate
proceeding. 223
Despite these bursts of enthusiasm for the transactional test, many
courts continue to apply all four factors when evaluating the claim
preclusion requirement of identical claim or cause of action, taking a

217. Fluke Capital & Mgmt. Servs. Co. v. Richmond, 106 Wash. 2d 614, 620, 724 P.2d 356, 361
(1986). The court stated that:
A claim includes “all rights of the [claimant] to remedies against the defendant with respect to
all or any part of the transaction, or series of connected transactions, out of which the action
arose”, without regard to whether the issues actually were raised or litigated. Restatement,
supra, § 24(1), at 196. See Sanwick v. Puget Sound Title Ins. Co., 70 Wash. 2d 438, 423 P.2d
624 (1967). See also Trautman, 60 WASH. L. REV. at 813–19.
Id.
218. See Sound Built Homes, Inc. v. Windermere Real Estate/S., Inc., 118 Wash. App. 617, 631,
72 P.3d 788, 795 (2003) (describing section 24 and stating that the “Washington Supreme Court has
applied these principles for decades”).
219. 181 Wash. 2d 28, 40, 330 P.3d 159, 165 (2014) (noting that identity of claim “requires that
the two cases involve substantially the same evidence and the same transactional nucleus of fact”).
220. Id. at 41, 330 P.3d at 166.
221. See Hadley v. Cowan, 60 Wash. App. 433, 442, 804 P.2d 1271, 1276 (1991). After
reviewing the four possible tests of identity of claims, the court noted that “[c]onfronted with this
variety of tests, one commentator has stated that courts may in fact be applying a commonsense
functional approach to the question of identity, and ‘a better approach would simply be to state so.
This would make clear to all what actually transpires.’” Id. at 442 n.12, 804 P.2d at 1276 n.12
(quoting Trautman, supra note 1, at 817).
222. Id. at 433, 804 P.2d 1271.
223. Id. at 442–43, 804 P.2d at 1276.
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forced march through four distinct factors: (1) transactional nucleus, (2)
same evidence, (3) same rights, and (4) whether a second action would
impair the result of the first action. 224
The transactional nucleus test could easily be the sole test for identity
of claims because it is broad and flexible enough to include the essence
of the inquiries advanced by the other tests. 225 It allows courts to
thoughtfully consider how claims are related in time, origin, and
motivation; this fosters fairness to parties on both sides of the litigation.
The test also allows courts to examine whether combining the claims
would form a convenient trial unit—a factor that would advance the core
efficiency goal of preclusion law. Washington courts will likely continue
to recognize the utility of the transactional nucleus test. But ideally, the
Supreme Court’s own use of the transactional test—if not outright
adoption—should embolden courts at all levels to rely less on the other
variants. This simpler test would increase clarity, which in turn should
allow courts to produce opinions that are clear, 226 and allow practitioners
to focus on a single test that is malleable and easy to apply.
III.

EMERGING PROBLEMS IN WASHINGTON PRECLUSION
LAW

Two of the most problematic aspects of preclusion law in Washington
have developed relatively recently, and thus were not addressed in
Professor Trautman’s article. These are the courts’ aggressive use of
nonparty preclusion and their frequent failure to apply correct full faith
and credit rules. This Part describes these problems and recommends
corrective actions—solutions that would be consistent with Professor
Trautman’s advocacy on behalf of doctrinal clarity, pragmatism, and
doing justice.
A.

Nonparty Preclusion

Washington courts have developed a variety of nonparty preclusion
mechanisms, including the doctrine of “virtual representation.” Virtual
representation can bind a nonparty to a prior judgment if a party with
closely aligned interests adequately represented the nonparty in the prior

224. See, e.g., Knuth v. Beneficial Wash., Inc., 107 Wash. App. 727, 733, 31 P.3d 694, 697–98
(2001) (applying all four factors to analyze claims in class action).
225. See Trautman, supra note 1, at 816–17.
226. For an example of judicial confusion caused by the four-factor claim identity test nested
within the four-element test for claim preclusion, see supra notes 159–163 and accompanying text.
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action. 227 In effect, the doctrine allows courts to use identity of interests
as a proxy for the identity of parties element of issue preclusion. 228
Unlike other forms of nonparty preclusion, this one does not require a
preexisting legal relationship between the nonparty and the party in the
prior case. 229
Professor Trautman did not use the virtual representation
terminology, probably because it had not yet gained a foothold in
Washington courts. But he did describe several related situations, such
as binding a nonparty witness who had an interest in the first case, and
binding other nonparties who participated in the prior litigation. 230 The
scope of nonparty preclusion in Washington has expanded far beyond
the nascent form it had when Professor Trautman wrote about the
witness preclusion cases—which even then were doctrinally suspect. 231
The expanded scope of nonparty preclusion triggers both practical and
substantive concerns.
In practical terms, while only a handful of Washington cases have
actually used virtual representation to deprive a litigant of his or her
“day in court,” the mere existence of the doctrine has forced both
litigants and courts to grapple with it in many other cases. 232 The
potential to win through virtual representation, even if usually
unrealized, motivates parties to litigate this theory, and courts must
devote time to analyzing it. 233 Moreover, every published decision in
which a court discusses virtual representation as a credible theory will
likely result in more litigants arguing the theory.

227. Garcia v. Wilson, 63 Wash. App. 516, 520, 820 P.2d 964, 966 (1991). The doctrine and its
history in the federal courts are discussed in depth in 18A WRIGHT, MILLER, & COOPER, supra note
115, § 4457.
228. Federal courts have used virtual representation in both the claim preclusion and issue
preclusion contexts. See, e.g., Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 888 (2008). But Washington courts
have confined it to issue preclusion situations—at least in recent years. E.g., Garcia, 63 Wash. App.
at 523 n.20, 820 P.2d at 968 n.20 (1991) (allowing collateral estoppel but noting “In order for an
action to be barred by res judicata there must be identity of persons and parties. The trial court erred
in ruling that Garcia’s action was barred by res judicata.”); cf. Fahrenwald v. Spokane Sav. Bank,
179 Wash. 61, 67, 35 P.2d 1117, 1119 (1934) (approving res judicata based on virtual
representation theory).
229. Martin H. Redish & William J. Katt, Taylor v. Sturgell, Procedural Due Process, and the
Day-in-Court Ideal: Resolving the Virtual Representation Dilemma, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1877,
1878 (2009).
230. See Trautman, supra note 1, at 819–20, 836–37.
231. Id. at 820; see supra note 62 and accompanying text.
232. See infra notes 324–325 and accompanying text.
233. See, e.g., Beres v. United States, 92 Fed. Cl. 737, 758–59 (2010) (rejecting argument that
virtual representation should bind fourteen plaintiffs who filed amicus brief in prior litigation).

06 - McGinnis, Final Auth with TOC.docx (Do Not Delete)

2015]

4/13/2015 11:49 AM

PRECLUSION LAW IN WASHINGTON STATE COURTS

113

Substantively, the doctrine is now out of line with a landmark United
States Supreme Court decision that resoundingly rejected the doctrine in
the federal law context: Taylor v. Sturgell. 234 Because the Court’s
disapproval of the doctrine was rooted in due process concerns, 235
Washington courts should examine the due process implications of
nonparty preclusion under state law and either significantly limit it—or
end it completely. While judicial efficiency is a laudable goal of
preclusion doctrine, it should not be achieved at the high cost of
depriving any litigant of a due process right to bring a claim in a forum
he or she chooses, and to control the litigation of that claim.
In this Section, federal court developments and the due process
problem will be discussed first, followed by a description of nonparty
preclusion in Washington. Analysis of problems posed by nonparty
preclusion will follow, along with recommendations.
1.

The Supreme Court’s Due-Process-Based Rejection of Virtual
Representation

Virtual representation has had many critics,236 including the justices
of the United States Supreme Court. In Taylor v. Sturgell, the Court
firmly rejected the doctrine as conflicting with the day-in-court ideal. 237
The Court grounded its decision on due process, building on two of its
landmark decisions 238 that rejected state court efforts to preclude
nonparties. 239 Therefore, although Taylor concerned federal preclusion
law, its principles are equally relevant to state law.
The two proceedings in Taylor were federal district court suits
seeking to compel the Federal Aviation Administration to produce
documents in response to Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)

234. Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880 (2008).
235. Id. at 891.
236. See, e.g., 18A WRIGHT, MILLER, & COOPER, supra note 115, § 4457.
237. 553 U.S. 880. For more on the day-in-court ideal, see Robert G. Bone, The Puzzling Idea of
Adjudicative Representation: Lessons for Aggregate Litigation and Class Actions, 79 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 577, 586 (2011) (citing Richards v. Jefferson County., 517 U.S. 793, 798 (1996) for the
proposition that “as a result of the historic day-in-court right, a judgment among parties does not
generally bind strangers to the lawsuit,” and Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 761–62 (1989) for
“recognizing that the day-in-court right is ingrained in the Court’s preclusion jurisprudence”);
Robert G. Bone, Rethinking the “Day in Court” Ideal and Nonparty Preclusion, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV.
193 (1992) (exploring the tension between the day-in-court right and the theory of virtual
representation)).
238. Richards, 517 U.S. at 801–02; Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42–43 (1940).
239. Taylor, 553 U.S. at 898–902.

06 - McGinnis, Final Auth with TOC.docx (Do Not Delete)

114

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

4/13/2015 11:49 AM

[Vol. 90:75

requests. 240 Herrick, an antique aircraft enthusiast, filed a FOIA request,
followed by a suit that he lost in federal court in Wyoming. 241 The Tenth
Circuit affirmed. 242 Within a month, Taylor, Herrick’s friend, filed an
identical FOIA request and sued in the Federal District Court for the
District of Columbia. 243 This trial court concluded that claim preclusion
barred Taylor’s suit, based on the FAA’s victory in Herrick’s earlier
suit. 244 Virtual representation was the basis for preclusion, because
Taylor was neither a party nor in privity with a party to the first case.245
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed, outlining a
test for virtual representation 246 and concluding that Taylor’s suit was
precluded. 247
The Supreme Court disapproved of the virtual representation theory 248
and found that Taylor was not adequately represented in Herrick’s
lawsuit. 249 The Court rejected the FAA’s argument that courts should
engage in a fact-driven inquiry to decide if a relationship between a
party and nonparty is “close enough” to bind the second litigant to the
judgment. 250 In doing so, the Court first emphasized “the fundamental
nature of the general rule that a litigant is not bound by a judgment to
which she was not a party.” 251 Second, the Court refused to support a
doctrine that would allow a quasi-class action without the due process
protections that a true class action affords. 252 Third, the Court observed
that a “diffuse balancing approach to nonparty preclusion would likely
240. Id. at 885.
241. Id. at 885–87.
242. Id. at 887.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 888–89.
245. Id. at 888.
246. Id. at 889–90.
247. Id. at 890–91.
248. Id. at 904.
249. Id. at 905.
250. Id. at 898.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 900–01. The Court explained that “adequate” representation for preclusion purposes
would require,
at a minimum: (1) The interests of the nonparty and her representative are aligned . . . and (2)
either the party understood herself to be acting in a representative capacity or the original court
took care to protect the interests of the nonparty. . . . In addition, adequate representation
sometimes requires (3) notice of the original suit to the persons alleged to have been
represented. . . . In the class-action context, these limitations are implemented by the
procedural safeguards contained in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.
Id. (citing Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 43 (1940); Richards v. Jefferson Cnty., 517 U.S. 793,
801–02 (1996)).
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create more headaches than it relieves.”253 Opaque standards would
burden courts and litigants, inconsistent with preclusion doctrine’s intent
“to reduce the burden of litigation on courts and parties,” the Court
noted. 254
Helpfully, the Court delineated six exceptions to the ban on nonparty
preclusion—situations that do not conflict with a party’s right to a day in
court. 255 Nonparty preclusion is permissible when:
1. a nonparty “agrees to be bound” by determination of issues
in the first action;
2. there is a qualifying, pre-existing substantive legal
relationship between the person to be bound and a party to
the judgment (e.g., succeeding owners of property, bailor
and bailee, assignor and assignee);
3. the prior case was a representative suit such as a properlyconducted class action, or a suit brought by a trustee,
guardian or other fiduciary;
4. a nonparty controlled the litigation in which the judgment
was rendered;
5. a party bound by a judgment tries to relitigate the case by
using a proxy or agent;
6. a statutory scheme expressly precludes successive litigation
by nonparties, such as bankruptcy or probate proceedings. 256
When the Court evaluated Taylor’s case under these six grounds for
nonparty preclusion, the FAA seriously contested only two grounds. 257
Regarding the third exception, the Court found no evidence that Taylor
was adequately represented in Herrick’s suit, or even that he knew of the
suit. 258 It was not apparent that “Herrick understood himself to be suing
on Taylor’s behalf.” 259 Nor did the Wyoming District Court take
“special care to protect Taylor’s interests.” 260
253. Id. at 901 (explaining likely burdens on district courts in applying a “standard that provides
no firm guidance,” and burdens on the litigants of “wide-ranging, time-consuming, and expensive
discovery tracking factors potentially relevant under [either the] seven- or five-prong tests”).
254. Id. at 901.
255. Id. at 893–95.
256. Id.
257. Taylor did not agree to be bound by Herrick’s litigation, did not control it, and did not have
a legal relationship with Herrick. Nor was there any statute that limited relitigation of the issues. Id.
at 904–05.
258. Id. at 905.
259. Id.
260. Id.
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The Court stopped short of rejecting the FAA’s remaining argument
on the fifth exception: that preclusion is proper when the second suit is
actually brought by a proxy on behalf of the person who lost the first
suit. 261 Although Taylor was not Herrick’s legal representative, he
conceded that he could be precluded if he were acting as an “undisclosed
agent” for Herrick, attempting to litigate Herrick’s case a second time. 262
This relationship issue had been touched upon when the D.C. Circuit
applied its virtual representation test, but the Supreme Court said that the
court below had not treated the Taylor-Herrick relationship as one of
agency. 263 (Instead, the court of appeals analyzed the second suit as
evidence of tactical maneuvering to get around preclusion rules, which
was a key part of the Circuit’s test for virtual representation.) 264 The
Supreme Court rejected the focus on tactical maneuvering, but remanded
to allow the parties to develop the argument that Taylor was Herrick’s
actual agent, litigating as a proxy. 265
2.

Nonparty Preclusion in Washington

Beyond traditional privity relationships, Washington courts have
allowed nonparty preclusion primarily in two types of cases. First, and
most problematic, are the virtual representation cases, which preclude
litigation by one who, though not a party, participated in some way in
the first action.266 Second is a group of cases involving issues of public
concern, such as election challenges, in which serial litigants are
precluded from suing the same entity (usually the government) to
challenge the same conduct.267 Because Taylor v. Sturgell definitively
rejected virtual representation, the Washington Supreme Court should do
the same. The Washington courts’ preclusion of successive litigation on
issues of public concern is slightly more defensible from a due process
261. Id. at 905–06.
262. Id. at 905.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id. The Court did not elaborate on the showing needed to establish one party as a litigating
agent for another. It did note that courts should proceed cautiously: “A mere whiff of ‘tactical
maneuvering’ will not suffice; instead, principles of agency law are suggestive.” Id. at 906. And
these principles would look to whether the party in the first case actually controls the agent’s
conduct in the second case. Id.
266. E.g., World Wide Video of Wash., Inc. v. City of Spokane, 125 Wash. App. 289, 103 P.3d
1265, review denied, 155 Wash. 2d 1014, 122 P.3d 186 (2005); Garcia v. Wilson, 63 Wash. App.
516, 820 P.2d 964 (1991).
267. E.g., In re Coday, 156 Wash. 2d 485, 501, 130 P.3d 809, 817 (2006) (applying claim
preclusion).
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standpoint. But it is nonetheless vulnerable to attack if Taylor’s
reasoning is extended, and the serial litigation problem could be solved
either through legislative action or through existing party joinder
mechanisms. Therefore, the Washington State Supreme Court should
strictly limit the potential for doctrinal sprawl in this category of cases
too.
a.

Virtual Representation

Modern virtual representation doctrine in this state began with
Hackler v. Hackler, 268 discussed in Professor Trautman’s article. 269 But
Garcia v. Wilson, 270 which relied on Hackler, is the case that kickstarted the expansion of virtual representation in the Washington trial
courts and court of appeals. 271 The Washington Supreme Court has only
once been asked to overturn a case that used virtual representation to
deny a plaintiff the right to litigate his own claim, but the Court denied
review. 272 This leaves extant a small but significant series of decisions
that violate due process, as later articulated by Taylor v. Sturgell.
In Garcia, the court of appeals affirmed a preclusion-based summary
judgment against the plaintiff in a personal injury action arising from a
car crash. 273 Ms. Garcia was a passenger in Mr. Macias’s car when it
was involved in an accident with the Wilsons’ car. 274 Macias sued the
Wilsons first, and Garcia testified at the trial. 275 Macias lost, and four
months later, Garcia brought her own suit against the Wilsons and
Macias. 276 The court of appeals agreed with Garcia that her claim against
the Wilsons was different from Macias’ claim against them, and
therefore did not examine the Wilsons’ claim preclusion defense. 277 But
it concluded the issue of Ms. Wilson’s negligence was the same in both
cases, opening the door to issue preclusion. 278
When Garcia argued she was not in privity with Macias, the court
268. 37 Wash. App. 791, 683 P.2d 241 (1984).
269. Trautman, supra note 1, at 837.
270. Garcia, 63 Wash. App. 516, 820 P.2d 964.
271. See infra notes 293–323 and accompanying text.
272. World Wide Video of Wash., Inc. v. City of Spokane, 125 Wash. App. 289, 103 P.3d 1265,
review denied, 155 Wash. 2d 1014, 122 P.3d 186 (2005).
273. 63 Wash. App. at 517, 522–23, 820 P.2d at 965, 968.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 517, 820 P.2d at 965.
276. Id. at 517–18, 820 P.2d at 965.
277. See id. at 518–19, 820 P.2d at 965–66.
278. Id. at 518 & n.5, 820 P.2d at 965 & n.5.
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found this argument “incorrect in view of the exception to the privity
requirement announced in Hackler v. Hackler.” 279 The court
acknowledged that the facts of Hackler were “clearly
distinguishable.” 280 That case involved a witness who testified in his
son’s dissolution proceeding, who described “deeding his house to his
son without mentioning that the house was eventually deeded back to
him.” 281 When the witness later sued to quiet title (after his daughter-inlaw received the house in the divorce), the court of appeals bound the
witness to the prior adjudication because he was “fully acquainted with
its character and object,” and “interested in its results.” 282
Extending the Hackler line, the court in Garcia enunciated several
factors designed to help “insure that the nonparty has had a vicarious day
in court.” 283 These included whether the former adjudication involved
(1) nonparty participation, for example, as a witness; (2) full and fair
litigation of the issue; and (3) evidence and testimony identical to that to

279. Id. at 519–20; 820 P.2d at 966 (citing Hackler v. Hackler, 37 Wash. App. 791, 683 P.2d 241,
review denied, 102 Wash. 2d 1021 (1984)).
280. Id. at 520, 820 P.2d at 966. One notable difference is that Hackler involved assignment of a
property deed, which triggered an argument that there was true privity between the assignors (son
and wife) and assignees (parents). Precedent excluded this situation from the realm of privity, but
the pre-existing legal relationship seemed to encourage the court to expand preclusion with an
exception for an interested witness. See Hackler, 37 Wash. App. at 794–95, 683 P.2d at 243.
281. Garcia, 63 Wash. App. at 520, 820 P.2d at 966.
282. Id. (quoting Hackler, 37 Wash. App. at 795, 683 P.2d 241). Authority for the court’s
conclusion in Garcia was apparently scant. The court cited a case that precluded a union member
from relitigating a factual issue his union had already litigated on his behalf. Robinson v. Hamed, 62
Wash. App. 92, 813 P.2d 171 (1991), cited by Garcia, 63 Wash. App. at 520 n.11, 820 P.2d at 966
n.11. Unremarkably, the court in Robinson concluded that the union member was the real party in
interest in an arbitration in which his union challenged his termination from employment. Id. at 100,
813 P.2d at 175–76. The union membership situation was hardly comparable to Garcia’s situation.
The Garcia court also invoked a case Hackler relied on: Bacon v. Gardner, 38 Wash. 2d 299, 312–
13, 229 P.2d 523, 531 (1951), cited by Garcia, 63 Wash. App. at 520, 820 P.2d at 966. In Bacon,
the court announced that a church was “estopped to deny” the agency authority of persons who sold
church property. 38 Wash. 2d at 312–13, 229 P.2d at 531. Although the court mentioned that some
church personnel had been witnesses in the case, and could have intervened, this was not a case of
preclusion. There was a single lawsuit, so there was no possibility for a prior judgment to be binding
on nonparties. Instead, the court used “estopped” in a more generic sense—perhaps hoping that its
dicta would ward off a future lawsuit by those church officials. See id. at 312–13, 229 P.2d at 531.
Although clearly not a solid basis for the development of the virtual representation doctrine, Bacon
is a case that courts and litigants frequently cite as supporting the doctrine. See, e.g., Beres v. United
States, 92 Fed. Cl. 737, 759 (2010); Desimone v. Spence, 51 Wash. 2d 412, 415 n.3, 318 P.2d 959,
961 n.2 (1957); Schaible v. Pike Place Mkt. Pres. & Dev. Auth., No. 38243–8–I, 1997 WL 159385,
at *3 n.18 (Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 7, 1997) (unpublished); Hackler, 37 Wash. App. at 795, 683 P.2d at
243.
283. Garcia, 63 Wash. App. at 520–21, 820 P.2d at 967.
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be presented in the new case. 284 Finally, the court said, “there must be
some sense that the separation of the suits was the product of some
manipulation or tactical maneuvering, such as when the nonparty
knowingly declined the opportunity to intervene but presents no valid
reason for doing so.” 285
Applying these factors, the court decided “nothing would be
accomplished by allowing the second action.” 286 Litigating Garcia’s
claim would require substantially the same evidence as the first case,
which was fully litigated. Garcia knew plenty about the first action
because she was a witness, and was living with the plaintiff. 287 She was
interested in the results because she already knew she was injured, and
yet opted not to intervene in Macias’ case. 288
The court explained that although there might be circumstances that
would justify failure to intervene in the first case, Garcia had made no
attempt to defend against summary judgment with an excuse of this sort
(apparently convinced that preclusion would not apply to her as a
nonparty). 289 Therefore, according to the court, the decision not to
intervene must have been tactical, and issue preclusion was justified.290
Aside from the Hackler case, there was little Washington precedent
supporting the Garcia decision. 291 Its result seems harsh, but to be fair to
the court, virtual representation was gaining traction nationally among
commentators and some courts. 292 Against a backdrop of momentum
nationwide, the unfortunate legacy of the case is that it has encouraged
preclusion to extend to other questionable situations.
For example, six years later, the court of appeals approved virtual
representation-based issue preclusion in a case with striking parallels to
Taylor v. Sturgell. 293 Each of the two actions involved Pike Place Market

284. Id.
285. Id. at 521, 820 P.2d at 967 (citing Hackler, 37 Wash. App. at 795, 683 P.2d 241; Bacon, 38
Wash. 2d at 313, 229 P.2d 523).
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 522, 820 P.2d at 967.
289. Id.
290. Id. Recall that the Supreme Court in Taylor refused to consider precluding a nonparty based
on evidence of tactical maneuvering. See supra note 265 and accompanying text.
291. See supra note 282.
292. Garcia, 63 Wash. App. at 520–21, 820 P.2d at 966–67 (citing 18 WRIGHT, MILLER &
COOPER, supra note 143, § 4457, at 494–502 (1981); Aerojet-General Corp. v. Askew, 511 F.2d
710, 719 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 908 96 S. Ct. 210, 46 L.Ed.2d 137 (1975); Note,
Collateral Estoppel of Nonparties, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1485, 1499–1500 (1974)).
293. Schaible v. Pike Place Mkt. Pres. & Dev. Auth., No. 38243–8–I, 1997 WL 159385 (Wash.
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tenants who sought disclosure of documents concerning leases in the
market. 294 Before he began his own public records case, Schaible was
aware of a fellow tenant’s dispute with the market’s development
authority. 295 He helped Franco, the fellow tenant, by testifying in a
mandamus hearing, assisting him with legal research, providing
documents, and discussing litigation strategy. 296 When Schaible later
brought his own action, the court applied the Garcia factors and held
that he could not pursue his case because he was virtually represented by
Franco. 297 The court found his involvement in the previous case “far
more extensive” than the participation that triggered preclusion in the
Garcia case. 298 And despite the fact that Franco appeared pro se, the
issue was fully and fairly litigated—in large part thanks to Schaible’s
help. 299
The court also rejected Schaible’s explanation for his decision not to
intervene in Franco’s case. 300 It reasoned that there could be no prejudice
in associating in the first action with Franco, who had been a guest in
Schaible’s home, and who researched with him at a law library. 301 The
court rejected the argument that Schaible had a right to control his own
trial strategy, and also concluded that his desire to be represented by an
attorney—in contrast to Franco’s pro se approach—did not “militat[e]
against applying the virtual representation doctrine.” 302 The court
concluded “[b]ecause these reasons are not convincing, we find that
Schaible failed to intervene for tactical reasons.” 303
If Schaible’s case were litigated today, he would be able to draw clear
factual parallels to Taylor v. Sturgell. There, the FAA relied on similar
acts to argue that Taylor should be precluded because he and Herrick
worked together: Herrick asked for Taylor’s help in restoring his plane,
he supplied information and documents to help Taylor in his case, and
Ct. App. Apr. 7, 1997) (unpublished).
294. Id. at *1–2.
295. Id.
296. Id. at *1.
297. Id. at *4–5.
298. Id. at *4.
299. Id.
300. Mr. Schaible relied on Garcia v. Wilson when he argued he should be excused from a duty
to intervene. He cited reasons such as “the association with the other plaintiff may be prejudicial,
differences in trial strategy, different witnesses to be called, or the desire to have independent
counsel.” Id. (citing Garcia v. Wilson, 63 Wash. App. 516, 522, 820 P.2d 964, 967 (1991)).
301. Schaible, 1997 WL 159385, at *4.
302. Id.
303. Id.
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the parties used the same lawyer in both cases.304 The Court rejected
virtual representation completely, making these facts irrelevant. 305 A
modern court in Washington would also have to discount arguments
based on litigants conferring with each other about their lawsuits. In
addition, a post-Taylor analysis of adequate representation should not be
so ready to punish a litigant for not intervening in another litigant’s
lawsuit just because they happened to have similar interests and know
each other socially.
In another unpublished decision, the court of appeals approved issue
preclusion against a party to an interpleader action in which her former
husband’s vacation benefits were being allocated.306 Although not a
party to a prior bankruptcy case, Cantu, the former wife, was bound by
the bankruptcy court’s unfavorable finding regarding ownership of the
former husband’s vacation benefits. 307 The court of appeals decided that
Cantu was virtually represented in the bankruptcy case by Baker, her
former husband, because they had “identical goals”: they had both
wanted the bankruptcy court to award the vacation benefits to Cantu, and
both would have benefitted from that decision. 308 Therefore, the court
concluded, Baker “made the same arguments that [the ex-wife] would
have made had she been a party in the bankruptcy action.” 309 This led
the court to find they were “in privity,” and that Cantu could not litigate
the issue on her own behalf in the interpleader action. 310
In this case, Cantu was shut out of the opportunity to pursue the
interpleader stake, merely because her ex-husband had already made the
arguments that she theoretically would have made, and those theoretical
arguments would have been directed to the same goal. If this case were
to be analyzed today, this kind of watered-down “representation” quite
obviously would not satisfy any of the nonparty preclusion categories
that Taylor left intact.
Only one published post-Garcia opinion allowed issue preclusion
based on a virtual representation theory: World Wide Video of

304. Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 889–90 (2008).
305. Id. at 904.
306. Aerospace Machinists Indus. Dist. Lodge 751 v. Baker, No. 38113–0–I, 1997 WL 206743,
at *1 (Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 28, 1997) (unpublished).
307. Id. at *3.
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. Id. In this factually complex case, the ex-wife had been listed as an unsecured creditor in the
bankruptcy proceeding, but the court did not appear to base its decision on that fact. There was no
discussion of tactical maneuvering, as in Garcia. Id. at *4.
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Washington, Inc. v. City of Spokane. 311 The plaintiff in the first case
operated three adult retail stores in buildings owned by Marco
Barbanti. 312 The video store owner brought, and lost, a § 1983 claim
against the City of Spokane in federal court, challenging under the First
Amendment and the state constitution the City’s limits on locations for
adult entertainment facilities. 313 The federal district court granted the
City’s motion for summary judgment on the video store owner’s
constitutional claims. 314 In the federal case, Barbanti, a lawyer, testified
in a deposition and by declaration about the plaintiff’s leases, 315 and the
local real estate market. 316
Concurrently with the federal action, Barbanti and the video store
owner were in state court to challenge a zoning decision regarding the
same properties. 317 In that case, Barbanti argued a city ordinance was
unconstitutional—an argument the trial court rejected because the same
issue had been decided in the federal court action, and Barbanti was
bound by that judgment. 318
The court of appeals affirmed, holding that Barbanti fell within the
interested-witness exception to the privity requirement, as outlined in
Garcia and Hackler. 319 The court explained that preclusion was proper
because
Mr. Barbanti testified in the federal action, was fully acquainted
with its character and object, and was clearly interested in its
results. Not only did he testify regarding the local real estate
market and the leases with WWV, but he argued that the
ordinances were unconstitutional. His decision not to intervene
appears purely tactical. 320
311. World Wide Video of Wash., Inc. v. City of Spokane, 125 Wash. App. 289, 103 P.3d 1265,
review denied, 155 Wash. 2d 1014, 122 P.3d 186 (2005). The court did not use the “virtual
representation” label, instead referring to an “exception to the privity requirement” for “certain
interested witnesses.” Id. at 306, 103 P.3d at 1274.
312. Id. at 298, 103 P.3d at 1270.
313. Id. at 299, 103 P.3d at 1270–71.
314. World Wide Video of Wash., Inc. v. City of Spokane, 227 F. Supp. 2d 1143, 1171 (E.D.
Wash. 2002), aff’d as amended on denial of reh’g and reh’g en banc, 368 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir. 2004)
(dismissing federal constitutional claims with prejudice and state constitutional claims without
prejudice).
315. See id. at 1168.
316. See World Wide Video of Wash. Inc., 125 Wash. App. at 299, 103 P.3d at 1270.
317. Id. at 300, 103 P. 3d at 1271.
318. Id. at 298–300, 103 P. 3d at 1270–71.
319. Id. at 306, 103 P.3d at 1274 (citing Garcia v. Wilson, 63 Wash. App. 516, 521–22, 820 P.2d
964 (1991); Hackler v. Hackler, 37 Wash. App. 791, 795, 683 P.2d 241 (1984)).
320. Id. at 306, 103 P.3d at 1274.
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The opinion reveals no factual analysis of whether Barbanti made a
tactical move. 321 But the court of appeals held preclusion justified. 322
The lack of analysis leaves the opinion weak, even under Washington’s
loose standard for nonparty preclusion. But under federal law at the time
the case was decided—and especially now in light of Taylor v.
Sturgell—the decision is unsupportable. 323
Of course, Washington courts only rarely find justification for virtual
representation, heeding Garcia’s warning that virtual representation
“must be applied cautiously in order to insure that the nonparty is not
unjustly deprived of her day in court.” 324 While that is encouraging from
a doctrinal perspective, it is cold comfort to litigants embroiled in these
fights (which must seem strange to one not versed in preclusion law).
For even the winners have lost, having been forced to spend time and
money defending their right to control litigation of their own claims.
And of course the courts have devoted time and resources to the problem
in many cases, 325 which largely defeats the efficiency values of
preclusion law.
321. From the facts in the case, one could infer that he cared enough about the issue to help his
tenants by testifying in the case, and he understood the case because he was a lawyer. He might
have been motivated by self-interest (hoping to ensure his tenants’ business prospered) or by
ideological zeal (to guard his First Amendment rights). Equally plausible, though, is speculation that
he preferred to focus on litigating the permit and zoning issues in the state court action, and not get
involved in a second lawsuit in federal court. Without actual evidence of strategic decision-making,
the court’s conclusion appears simply conclusory.
322. World Wide Video of Wash. Inc., 125 Wash. App. at 306, 103 P.3d at 1274.
323. In fact, the Washington courts should have used federal law to determine the prior federal
court judgment’s preclusive effect. See infra notes 430–435 and accompanying text. At the time,
federal preclusion law in the Ninth Circuit allowed nonparty preclusion in only the most limited
circumstances. See, e.g., Headwaters Inc. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 399 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 2005).
324. E.g., Frese v. Snohomish Cnty., 129 Wash. App. 659, 665, 120 P.3d 89, 93 (2005) (quoting
Garcia, 63 Wash. App. at 520, 820 P.2d) (rejecting virtual representation where a few plaintiffs
filed declarations in a prior suit, and there was no evidence of tactical maneuvering).
325. E.g., McDaniels v. Carlson, 108 Wash. 2d 299, 304–05, 738 P.2d 254, 258 (1987) (rejecting
argument that cohabitants were in privity regarding woman’s dissolution proceeding when partner
had different interests and did not participate in his partner’s action); Dillon v. Seattle Deposition
Reporters, LLC, 179 Wash. App. 41, 66, 316 P.3d 1119, 1131, review granted, 180 Wash. 2d 1009,
325 P.3d 913 (2014) (rejecting virtual representation because no evidence of tactical maneuvering);
Diversified Wood Recycling, Inc. v. Johnson, 161 Wash. App. 891, 905–06, 251 P.3d 908, 916–17
(2011) (discussing virtual representation but concluding it would be premature to apply it, given
procedural posture of the case); Paradise Orchards Gen. P’ship v. Fearing, 122 Wash. App. 507,
515, 94 P.3d 372, 376 (2004) (finding lawyer who testified on client’s behalf in prior action had no
opportunity to litigate issues, nor to intervene, so preclusion would be improper); Ward v.
Torjussen, 52 Wash. App. 280, 286, 758 P.2d 1012, 1015 (1988) (reversing issue preclusion based
on nonparty police officer’s testimony at prior traffic court proceeding; noting “appellant did not
have an opportunity to control the litigation or participate at a level commensurate with due
process”).
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Nonparty Preclusion in Public Law Cases

A second group of nonparty preclusion cases in Washington involves
successive efforts to litigate an issue of public concern. These cases
typically concern challenges to government conduct, such as land use
decisions, conduct of elections, and implementation of regulations. 326
This type of nonparty preclusion responds to the obvious risk of
allowing serial litigation on issues of public concern: inconsistent
judgments could very easily create incompatible standards for
government conduct.
As the Washington Supreme Court explained in In re Coday, “where
‘nominally different parties’ pursue causes of action as voters, on behalf
of the body politic generally, such parties have been found to ‘have
sufficiently identical interests to satisfy the “identity of parties” inquiry’
because they possess ‘the same legal interests as all citizens of the
state.’” 327
In Coday, the Court dismissed an election contest that challenged the
results of the 2004 governor’s election, holding that the election contest
was identical to a lawsuit adjudicated in another county, and therefore
barred by res judicata. 328 Although the challenger did not participate in
the earlier case, “she is [now] acting in the same capacity, and has the
same legal interest, as the participants in that case.” 329 The Court
characterized her interest in a fair and accurate election as identical to
that of the prior parties—and indeed to that of all Washington citizens. 330
She was an “identical party” bringing a case that involved an identical
cause of action and subject matter, so claim preclusion was proper.331
326. Perhaps the earliest Washington case of this sort is Stallcup v. City of Tacoma, 13 Wash.
141, 42 P. 541 (1895). There, the Washington State Supreme Court held a taxpayer precluded from
bringing a suit when an earlier suit was “brought by a taxpayer, in behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, the city was the principal defendant there, as it is the sole defendant here, and
there is identity in the subject matter of the litigation.” Id. at 147, 42 P. at 543.
327. In re Coday, 156 Wash. 2d 485, 501, 130 P.3d 809, 817 (2006) (quoting In re Recall of
Pearsall-Stipek, 136 Wash. 2d 255, 261, 961 P.2d 343 (1998)); accord Snyder v. Munro, 106 Wash.
2d 380, 384, 721 P.2d 962, 964 (1986) (holding that “all citizens of Washington state were well
represented in” a prior suit brought by the leaders of the state Democratic and Republican
organizations and state government officials, and that therefore res judicata barred registered voters
from raising the same claim in a subsequent action).
328. 156 Wash. 2d at 501–02, 130 P.3d at 817. In the same case, the court dismissed three other
election contests for failure to state a cognizable claim. Id. at 498–500, 130 P.2d at 815–16.
329. Id. at 501, 130 P.2d at 817.
330. Id. at 502, 130 P.3d at 817.
331. Id. at 501–02, 130 P.3d at 817. Support for this holding is found in In re Recall of PearsallStipek, 136 Wash. 2d 255, 262, 961 P.2d 343, 346–47 (1998), as amended (Oct. 17, 2000). Dealing
with successive recall petitions, the court said the litigant’s interests were
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Notably, the court in Coday did not rely on virtual representation. It
treated the election challenger’s interest as coextensive with the interest
of anyone who might challenge the election. 332 And the court precluded
an entire cause of action, not just an individual issue as in virtual
representation cases. 333 In essence, the court treated the prior litigation as
a class action that would bind any future party with the same claim and
same interest.
The Washington Court of Appeals extended the Coday approach to
sequential suits seeking to compel a county assessor to disclose audit
documents. 334 In Harley H. Hoppe & Associates, Inc. v. King County, 335
the court found Coday’s reasoning applicable in the Public Records Act
context, in that “any member of the public has standing to bring such a
public records request.” 336 The court held that both the claim preclusion
and issue preclusion tests were satisfied, finding identity of parties
because the plaintiffs in the first and second cases had both a fatherdaughter relationship and an employment relationship. 337 Although this
decision came three years after Taylor v. Sturgell, there is no mention of
the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in the parties’ briefs or in the
court of appeals’ opinion—despite both cases having involved sequential
public records requests and ensuing litigation.
Although there are two older court of appeals decisions that have
precluded nonparties in public issue cases, 338 other decisions have held
no different from that of any other citizen: proceeding to the signature gathering stage of the
recall process. To hold otherwise would permit repeated litigation of the same charge based on
the same facts by merely substituting a different named party. . . . This would defeat the
finality and conservation of judicial resources concerns that underlie the res judicata doctrine.
Id.
332. In re Coday, 156 Wash. 2d at 501, 130 P.3d at 817.
333. Id. at 500–02, 130 P.3d at 816–17 (using res judicata terminology and test).
334. Harley H. Hoppe & Assocs., Inc. v. King Cnty., 162 Wash. App. 40, 255 P.3d 819, review
denied, 172 Wash. 2d 1019, 262 P.3d 64 (2011).
335. Id.
336. Id. at 51–52, 255 P.3d at 824. Given the factual context of a public records request, it is
difficult to understand how this case is materially different from the Schaible case, discussed supra
note 294. Schaible was treated exclusively as a virtual representation case, while Hoppe was
analyzed as part of the Coday public litigation branch of nonparty preclusion.
337. Harley H. Hoppe & Assocs., Inc., 162 Wash. App.. at 51, 255 P.3d at 824 (noting that both
“were represented by the same legal counsel and relied on the same legal briefing and arguments,”
and that “Amy Hoppe is in privity with Hoppe, since she is both an employee and Harley Hoppe’s
daughter.”). But see Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 897 (2008) (citing S. Cent. Bell Tel. Co. v.
Alabama, 526 U.S. 160, 168 (1999) (observing that hiring the same lawyer “created no special
representational relationship between the earlier and later plaintiffs” so as to justify preclusion)).
338. See Camer v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 52 Wash. App. 531, 535, 762 P.2d 356, 359 (1988)
(applying claim preclusion in an action by a school-child whose mother and siblings had sued the
school district previously over similar issues, the court observed: “If we adopted the Camers’
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the line in this type of case. In Stevens County v. Futurewise, 339 for
example, the court rejected the county’s arguments for claim and issue
preclusion in the context of serial litigation over land use decisions. The
county argued that it had to defend the same provision of its code in
three separate legal actions, “while Futurewise had standing and notice
but chose to advise another party rather than to participate in the two
prior actions.” 340 The court refused to bind the advocacy group to the
outcome of the previous case by an individual citizen, finding lack of
identity in parties, subject matter, and cause of action. It also rejected
virtual representation, and confined the Coday rule to the election
contest setting. 341
3.

Why We Should Care About Nonparty Preclusion

The scope of nonparty preclusion in Washington has expanded in
ways unforeseen when Professor Trautman published his article in 1985.
As mentioned above, this expanded scope triggers both practical and
substantive concerns, which this Section will explain. Briefly, an overly
broad definition of preclusion allows a prior judgment, litigated by
someone else, to bind parties who should not be bound. This deprives
these parties of their due process rights to litigate their claims. The broad
definition also impedes efficiency in litigation, and even interferes with
other mechanisms by which courts manage litigation—particularly the
rules of civil procedure regarding intervention and necessary party
joinder.
a.

The Resource Conservation Problem

Virtual representation may look like a tiny blip on the radar of
Washington courts, because few decisions actually preclude litigation
under this theory. But in practical terms, if the doctrine exists, lawyers
will (and arguably must) use it to pursue even the slight chance of
gaining advantage in litigation. This forces both litigants and courts to
reasoning on this issue, each time another Camer child entered the Seattle school system, they
would have the right to bring exactly the same complaint and have it heard through the judicial
system.”); Bergh v. State, 21 Wash. App. 393, 585 P.2d 805 (1978) (allowing issue preclusion
against nineteen plaintiffs, only fifteen of whom were members of gillnetters association that sued
previously on same issues).
339. 146 Wash. App. 493, 192 P.3d 1 (2008).
340. Id. at 502, 192 P.3d at 6.
341. Id. at 505, 192 P.3d at 7 (“This exception is applied to actions brought by voters on behalf of
the general body politic. . . . As explained in Coday, such parties have sufficiently identical interests
because they have the same legal interests as all state citizens.”).
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grapple with it in many cases.342 This reality is at odds with one of the
primary policy reasons behind preclusion doctrine: to conserve judicial
resources. 343
Professor Trautman advocated a clear and pragmatic approach to
claim and issue preclusion, and the same pragmatic advice is warranted
thirty years later: Washington courts should seriously consider the
practical benefits of a rule that precludes only true parties or those in
traditional privity relationships. This would allow courts to use the same
party-identity tests in both claim and issue preclusion analysis, instead of
the divided tests used today. 344 Lawyers would be better able to predict
outcomes and could avoid wasting their clients’ money litigating the
ambiguous and subjective doctrine of virtual representation. Courts
would spend less time evaluating whether a second action could be
pursued, and often would be able to use stare decisis to efficiently
resolve the second case. 345
b.

The Due Process Problem

Taylor’s clear and emphatic rejection of virtual representation is
obviously useful to any court dealing with nonparty preclusion, but it
raises the question: Does Taylor apply to states, which claim a high
degree of autonomy in how they treat judgments of their own courts?
The answer should be “yes—at least to some degree.” The decision’s
due process underpinning is the key to this answer. Furthermore, while
Taylor dealt with how federal courts use preclusion, two landmark
Supreme Court cases have applied similar reasoning to state court
decisions, 346 and Taylor explicitly built upon that foundation.
The Court in Taylor grounded its holding, in part, on Richards v.
Jefferson County. 347 In this case, the United States Supreme Court
reversed an Alabama Supreme Court decision348 that allowed claim
preclusion against taxpayers who were absent from an earlier class
action challenging a county’s occupational tax. 349 The Alabama
342. See supra note 325 (decisions that consider but reject virtual representation).
343. See Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153–54 (1979).
344. See Garcia v. Wilson, 63 Wash. App. 516, 518 & n.20, 820 P.2d 964, 965, 968 & n.20
(1991).
345. See Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 903–04 (2008).
346. See Richards v. Jefferson Cnty., 517 U.S. 793 (1996); Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
347. 517 U.S. 793 (1996), cited in Taylor, 553 U.S. at 891–905.
348. Jefferson Cnty. v. Richards, 662 So. 2d 1127 (Ala. 1995), rev’d, 517 U.S. 793 (1996),
vacated, 682 So. 2d 409 (Ala. 1996).
349. Richards, 517 U.S. at 797.
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Supreme Court had concluded that the plaintiffs in a second case,
although strangers to the first, were adequately represented by plaintiffs
in the first lawsuit concerning essentially identical issues. 350 The
Supreme Court in Richards concluded that the state court’s expanded
use of preclusion violated the newcomers’ due process rights. 351
The Court’s opinions in both Richards and Taylor relied on the
landmark decision in Hansberry v. Lee, 352 which also invalidated—on
due process grounds—a state court’s decision to bind nonparties to
earlier litigation. 353 The Richards Court explained:
a prior proceeding, to have binding effect on absent parties,
would at least have to be “so devised and applied as to insure
that those present are of the same class as those absent and that
the litigation is so conducted as to insure the full and fair
consideration of the common issue.” 354
In Richards, the Court noted, the taxpayers who brought the first suit
did not sue on behalf of a class; their pleadings did not purport
to assert any claim against or on behalf of any nonparties; and
the judgment they received did not purport to bind any county
taxpayers who were nonparties. . . . As a result, there is no
reason to suppose that the [first] court took care to protect the
interests of petitioners in the manner suggested in Hansberry.
Nor is there any reason to suppose that the individual taxpayers
in [the first case] understood their suit to be on behalf of absent
county taxpayers. Thus, to contend that the plaintiffs in [the first
case] somehow represented petitioners, let alone represented
them in a constitutionally adequate manner, would be “to
attribute to them a power that it cannot be said that they had
assumed to exercise.” 355

350. Id. at 799 (citing Richards, 662 So. 2d at 1130).
351. The Court observed:
The limits on a state court’s power to develop estoppel rules reflect the general consensus “‘in
Anglo-American jurisprudence that one is not bound by a judgment in personam in a litigation
in which he is not designated as a party or to which he has not been made a party by service of
process.’ Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40, 61 S. Ct. 115 [117], 85 L. Ed. 22 (1940). . . . This
rule is part of our ‘deep-rooted historic tradition that everyone should have his own day in
court.’ 18 C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4449, p.
417 (1981).’ Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 761–762, 109 S. Ct. 2180, 2184, 104 L.Ed.2d 835
(1989).”
Id. at 798.
352. 311 U.S. 32 (1940), cited in Taylor, 553 U.S. at 884.
353. Id. at 41–44.
354. 517 U.S. at 801 (quoting Hansberry, 311 U.S. at 43).
355. Id. at 801–02 (quoting Hansberry, 311 U.S. at 46).
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Few state appellate courts have had occasion to examine how Taylor
v. Sturgell affects virtual representation in their own courts, but there is
definite awareness of the decision’s due process implications.356
Moreover, scholarly discussion of virtual representation in the wake of
Taylor focuses heavily on due process aspects of the decision. 357
Scholars have criticized the Court for having inadequately explained
exactly how due process concerns compel the outcome, 358 but both the
opinion’s text and more extensive analysis of its underpinnings support a
conclusion that it is truly grounded in due process—whether deeply or
superficially. 359
Assuming virtual representation fails because of due process
protections, and not merely because of federal common law, the
Supreme Court’s reasoning must apply to nonparty preclusion in
Washington courts. Further, it is difficult to conclude that the due
process analysis would mandate rejecting virtual representation while
preserving the nonparty claim preclusion cases involving issues of
public concern. 360 Therefore, both categories of nonparty preclusion
cases are likely at risk under a due process analysis. 361
c.

The Forced Intervention Problem

Another significant problem with preclusion law in Washington is its
sense of obligatory intervention: a nonparty who was aware of a prior
356. See, e.g., Franco v. District of Columbia, 3 A.3d 300, 306 (D.C. Ct. App. 2010) (applying
Taylor test and concluding nonparty was not adequately represented in prior case); Pang Nhia Thao
v. Cent. States Health & Life Co. of Omaha, No. A09-0204, 2009 WL 3255883, at *3–5 (Minn. Ct.
App. Oct. 13, 2009) (noting Taylor’s due process holding, and concluding Minnesota law would
compel same result); see also Johnson v. GlaxoSmithKline, Inc., 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 607, 618 n.8 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2008), as modified on denial of reh’g, (Oct. 14, 2008) (discussing the potential effect of
Taylor in the context of a state court class action).
357. See, e.g., Redish & Katt, supra note 229, at 1894 (“[A]lthough the Court in Taylor failed to
explicate the theoretical underpinnings of the day-in-court ideal, it nevertheless relied on that ideal
in rejecting virtual representation. The Court recognized that the value of a party’s participation in
litigation is a strong due process value that cannot be overcome simply because a litigant’s interests
are similar to those of a prior litigant.”); Victor Petrescu, Crash and Burn: Taylor v. Sturgell’s
Radical Redefinition of the Virtual Representation Doctrine, 64 U. MIAMI L. REV. 735 (2010).
358. E.g., Redish & Katt, supra note 229, at 1887, 1894–95; Petrescu, supra note 357, at 752–53.
359. It is beyond the scope of this Article to resolve the debate about whether Taylor is truly a
foundational due process decision. But a well-reasoned and detailed explanation of the due process
underpinnings is found in Redish & Katt, supra note 229, at 1888–95.
360. But see infra notes 369–409 and accompanying text.
361. “Although Taylor is about claim preclusion, some lower courts and scholars read the opinion
to bar the use of virtual representation for both claim and issue preclusion.” Bone, Puzzling Idea,
supra note 237, at 584 n.31 (citing Lincoln-Dodge, Inc. v. Sullivan, 588 F. Supp. 2d 224, 235
(D.R.I. 2008)); Redish & Katt, supra note 229, at 1878.
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action but failed to join has been one of the prime targets of nonparty
preclusion doctrine. 362 For this reason, Washington courts ought to
consider another United States Supreme Court decision, Martin v.
Wilks. 363 Here, the Court rejected an argument that new parties should
not be permitted to litigate issues in a new action if they were aware of a
prior case but passed up an opportunity to intervene. 364
The Court explained that,
Joinder as a party, rather than knowledge of a lawsuit and an
opportunity to intervene, is the method by which potential
parties are subjected to the jurisdiction of the court and bound
by a judgment or decree. The parties to a lawsuit presumably
know better than anyone else the nature and scope of relief
sought in the action, and at whose expense such relief might be
granted. It makes sense, therefore, to place on them a burden of
bringing in additional parties where such a step is indicated,
rather than placing on potential additional parties a duty to
intervene when they acquire knowledge of the lawsuit. The
linchpin of the “impermissible collateral attack” doctrine—the
attribution of preclusive effect to a failure to intervene—is
therefore quite inconsistent with Rule 19 and Rule 24. 365
For the same reasons, Washington courts should reject the forcedintervention aspect of Washington preclusion law. Unlike Taylor’s
holding, the Wilks Court’s conclusion is not compelled by due process
concerns, so it does not apply directly to state courts. 366 But it is based
on a problem very relevant to Washington courts: that compelled
intervention could interfere with other procedural rules, including
joinder rules that mirror the federal rules to a great extent. 367
Abandoning forced intervention would avoid the trap outlined in Wilks,
and would allow existing joinder rules to play their important role in

362. Supra notes 269–292 and accompanying text.
363. Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989) (superseded by statute as stated in Landgraf v. USI
Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 251 (1994)).
364. Id. at 762.
365. Id. at 765.
366. The decision was instrumental in at least one Washington decision, but it applied federal law
because it was determining the preclusive effect of a federal judgment. Loveridge v. Fred Meyer,
Inc., 72 Wash. App. 720, 726–27, 864 P.2d 417, 420 (1993), aff’d, 125 Wash. 2d 759, 887 P.2d 898
(1995) (refusing to bind employee to EEOC consent decree merely because she declined to
intervene in the EEOC action).
367. See generally John B. Oakley, A Fresh Look at the Federal Rules in State Courts, 3 NEV.
L.J. 354, 356–57, 373 (2002) (describing Washington’s transition from a “Federal Rules Replica”
state to a more loosely conforming state after federal rules amendments in 1993 and 2000).
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determining when a party is bound by a judgment. 368
4.

An Exception for Cases of Public Concern?

Virtual representation in Washington courts is in trouble, for the
reasons just discussed. But there is an argument for treating differently
cases that allow nonparty preclusion when there is serial litigation over a
public matter such as a statute, zoning decision or election. Line-drawing
would be difficult, however, and there is a real possibility that nonparty
preclusion even in these cases is impermissible in the post-Taylor era.
Scholars have begun to argue that nonparties can be precluded in
cases like these, despite Taylor. 369 The arguments are based on the idea
that even a day-in-court ideal (based on due process) is flexible enough
to yield when it conflicts with important institutional values.370 This
balancing concept is not new; litigant autonomy has never been seen as
absolute. 371 One scholar suggests that when the Court considered virtual
representation in Taylor, it was an “easy case from a procedural due
process standpoint” because there was no compelling reason to prevent
Taylor from litigating his own case; little efficiency would have been
gained. 372 But the Court did not confront the far more difficult case that
involves “indivisible relief”—in which one suit grants relief that is
inseparable from the relief sought in a second suit. 373
Indivisible relief is illustrated perfectly by In re Coday: 374 if one case
368. See 18A WRIGHT, MILLER, & COOPER, supra note 115, § 4452.
369. See, e.g., Bone, Puzzling Idea, supra note 237, at 601–24; Redish & Katt, supra note 229, at
1879–81. Although Redish and Katt do not argue for preclusion simply because a case involves an
issue of public concern, their focus on cases that involve contradictory relief fits well within the line
of Washington cases that have protected judgments relating to public issues.
370. Redish & Katt, supra note 229, at 1908. Professor Bone argues:
that the day-in-court right is best understood as a right to control litigation insofar as relevant
institutional considerations support personal control. It is a right insofar as it resists or
constrains reasons for limiting control that sound exclusively in improving aggregate welfare
or achieving collective social goals. But it does not guarantee a zone of relatively unfettered
freedom. Litigation is not a field where adversaries engage in unrestrained combat. Litigation
is the way adjudication accomplishes its goals, and the public goals of adjudication shape the
procedural rights litigants possess.
Bone, Puzzling Idea, supra note 237, at 624.
371. Redish & Katt, supra note 229, at 1880 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 347–49
(1976)).
372. Id. at 1895.
373. Id. The article divides indivisible relief into three categories: “double liability,”
“contradictory liability,” and “inconsistent liability.” The authors contend that each category gives
rise to distinct due process problems, and receives “differing weight[ ] in the due process balance.”
Id. at 1901.
374. 156 Wash. 2d 485, 130 P.3d 809 (2006).

06 - McGinnis, Final Auth with TOC.docx (Do Not Delete)

132

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

4/13/2015 11:49 AM

[Vol. 90:75

validates the results of an election, a second suit that reaches a different
result (invalidation) would introduce contradictory liability on the part of
a defendant election official. The official could not comply with both
judgments. 375 If a court is satisfied that nonparties were in fact
adequately represented and had aligned interests, then perhaps it would
be justified in binding them to the original judgment. 376 In essence, this
approach would extend privity to nonparties only when the first suit
litigated important public issues in a way that represented the interests of
all potential plaintiffs affected by the law or practice being challenged.
The United States Supreme Court may well disagree with this
approach, however. The State of Alabama lost when it argued for this
approach in its brief in Richards:
In its decision in this case, the Alabama Supreme Court
followed well established precedent, both in Alabama and many
other states, to the effect that, in the absence of fraud or
collusion, a citizen can obtain a binding judgment on all other
citizens in a case where no private interest is involved, the right
sought to be enforced is a public right, and the people are
regarded as the real party in interest. With respect to the vital
question of how the first party in such litigation can bind a party
who subsequently attempts to litigate the same public issue, the
answer has been that the privity of the parties results from their
identity of interest in the same public question. Whether called
virtual representation or identity of interest, the privity between
the parties for purposes of res judicata is pragmatically
established by recognizing that no real due process interest is
served by permitting a public issue, once adequately adjudicated
through the competent efforts of bona fide adversaries, to be
subsequently relitigated by other parties who have the same
interest in the question and will be affected by the outcome in
the same way. 377
375. Professors Redish and Katt state that “contradictory liability inherently violates due process
and therefore must be avoided.” Redish & Katt, supra note 229, at 1904 (invoking Professor Henry
Hart’s point: “People repeatedly subjected, like Pavlov’s dogs, to two or more inconsistent sets of
directions, without means of resolving the inconsistencies, could not fail in the end to react as the
dogs did. The society, collectively, would suffer a nervous breakdown.”).
376. Adequate representation should be evaluated by asking if the interests of the representative
party and represented party are aligned and if the representative party had sufficient incentive and
resources to litigate vigorously. Id. at 1908–12.
377. Brief for Respondent, Richards v. Jefferson Cnty., 369 U.S. 1 (1961) (no. 95-386), 1996 WL
74178, at *29 (citations omitted). The State’s brief cited decisions from many other states to
demonstrate that a citizen suit can bind nonparties; included among the citations is Stallcup v. City
of Tacoma, 13 Wash. 141, 42 P. 541 (1895). See supra note 326.
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The Supreme Court rejected the argument, 378 with one important
caveat. First, the Court concluded there was no evidence that the
plaintiffs in the first proceeding “provided representation sufficient to
make up for the fact that petitioners neither participated in . . . nor had
the opportunity to participate in, the [first] action. Accordingly, due
process prevents the former from being bound by the latter’s
judgment.” 379 Next, the Court addressed the “citizen suit” part of the
argument by dividing citizen suits into those alleging harm to an
individual, and those challenging a public action that has only an indirect
impact on an individual litigant’s interests.380 The Court stated “As to
this [latter] category of cases, we may assume that the States have wide
latitude to establish procedures not only to limit the number of judicial
proceedings that may be entertained but also to determine whether to
accord a taxpayer any standing at all.” 381 Because the litigants in
Richards brought “a federal constitutional challenge to a State’s attempt
to levy personal funds,” they were protected by a due process right to
their own day in court. 382
In Taylor, the FAA similarly argued that “nonparty preclusion should
apply more broadly in ‘public law’ litigation than in ‘private law’
controversies.” 383 The FAA asserted that the Court in Richards singled
out a situation in which “the plaintiff [a taxpayer in that case] has a
reduced interest in controlling the litigation ‘because of the public nature
of the right at issue.’” 384 The FAA relied on the statement in Richards
about the states’ wide latitude to limit the number of citizen suits on
public issues. 385 In response, the Taylor Court clarified that with this
statement the Court had envisioned a legislative solution—not a judicial
one—to the problem of successive lawsuits on a public issue. 386
The Court also rebuffed the FAA when it argued that public law
litigation had the potential to be especially vexatious because there is a
potentially unlimited supply of plaintiffs to challenge most government
action. 387 The Court responded that “stare decisis will allow courts
378.
379.
380.
381.
382.
383.
384.
385.
386.
387.

Richards v. Jefferson Cnty., 517 U.S. 793, 802–04 (1996).
Id. at 802 (citations omitted).
Id. at 802–03.
Id. at 803.
Id.
Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 882 (2007).
Id. at 902.
Id. (quoting Richards, 517 U.S. at 803); see supra note 381 and accompanying text.
Id. at 903.
Id. at 903–04.
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swiftly to dispose of repetitive suits brought in the same circuit. Second,
even when stare decisis is not dispositive, ‘the human tendency not to
waste money will deter the bringing of suits based on claims or issues
that have already been adversely determined against others.’” 388
It remains to be seen whether the Taylor Court correctly assessed the
deterrent effect of frugality, but its treatment of the issue appears overly
simplistic. The “human tendency not to waste money” 389 seems most
likely to deter duplicative suits by parties who are motivated primarily
by money, such as businesses or individuals involved in contract
disputes. 390 But one could argue that issues of public concern almost
guarantee serial litigation, because parties are more likely to be
motivated by politics, ideology or principles, with less regard to cost. 391
In addition, parties often choose to litigate in order to strategically set
precedent, 392 and that seems a quite plausible motivator with regard to
important public or political issues.
More concretely, the Court in Taylor relied on a stare decisis solution
that is obviously limited. For example, a case might be vigorously
litigated and result in a judgment. Without an appeal, this trial court
judgment could lead to claim preclusion, but not to stare decisis. 393 A
cause of action might be dismissed pursuant to settlement, and while this
judgment qualifies for claim preclusive effect, 394 it would have no
precedential value.395 Without preclusion, and without binding
388. Id.
389. Id. at 904 (quoting D. SHAPIRO, CIVIL PROCEDURE: PRECLUSION IN CIVIL ACTIONS 97
(2001)).
390. The Supreme Court’s statement seems to be based on the classic economic model of
litigation, which “assumes that all parties are economically rational, in the sense that they seek to
maximize only their economic wealth.” Frank B. Cross, In Praise of Irrational Plaintiffs, 86
CORNELL L. REV. 1, 15 (2000).
391. See id. at 15–25 (compiling extensive body of scholarship that describes non-economic
motivations to begin or continue litigating); Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96
COLUM. L. REV. 903, 924 (1996) (observing human tendency to act differently when acting as a
citizen rather than as a consumer).
392. Cross, supra note 390, at 6–8.
393. This was the situation in In re Coday, 156 Wash. 2d 485, 491, 130 P.3d 809, 811 (2006),
where an un-appealed superior court decision provided the basis for claim preclusion. Some sort of
comity among trial courts might be expected, but not stare decisis in a technical sense. Of course,
the same judgment would qualify for claim preclusion, assuming identity of parties and claims.
394. E.g., Schoeman v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 106 Wash. 2d 855, 861, 726 P.2d 1, 4 (1986).
395. This type of situation resulted in a fascinating flurry of litigation in Headwaters Inc. v. U.S.
Forest Service, 399 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 2005). The district court precluded two environmental
organizations from litigating the validity of several timber sales because other advocacy
organizations had challenged the sales and settled their case against the Forest Service a year earlier.
Id. at 1050. The first time the Ninth Circuit decided the case, it affirmed the trial judge’s sua sponte
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precedent, there is no clear way to prevent new litigants repeatedly filing
the same claim in the same court.
Even if stare decisis is not a complete solution, however, existing
joinder rules can be used to lower the risk of conflicting judgments in
public law cases, and that risk of inconsistent judgments is one of the
primary rationales for preventing successive suits. In any action
involving a public right, Washington courts should encourage parties to
identify and seek to join those who might claim an interest in the same
right or issue. For example, if a defendant is concerned about serial
litigation by indistinguishable plaintiffs, it could countersue for a
declaratory judgment against the class of persons the plaintiff is thought
to represent. 396 Interpleader can be useful in some situations involving a
“stake” vulnerable to conflicting demands, 397 and existing parties can
move for joinder of absentees who are “needed for just adjudication.” 398
An absent party could voluntarily intervene in order to protect her
interests, 399 although making this intervention effectively mandatory

dismissal of the case, clearly sympathetic to the trial court’s frustration with an overcrowded docket
and repetitious litigation by what it saw as related parties. Headwaters Inc. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 382
F.3d 1025, 1031–32 (9th Cir. 2004), withdrawn, superseded on denial of reh’g en banc, 399 F.3d
1047 (9th Cir. 2005). The court then replaced the opinion with one that reached the opposite
conclusion, holding “the district court here applied the privity doctrine without establishing, among
other prerequisites, that the present plaintiffs were adequately represented in the prior suit, and
without giving plaintiffs an opportunity to demonstrate that they were not.” Headwaters Inc., 399
F.3d at 1050. One commentator called this case a missed opportunity to create an alternative process
for citizen suits that affect public interests. She proposed conducting the litigation as a quasi-class
action, in which interested parties are notified and allowed to intervene, understanding that the
litigation would be binding on them through an expanded version of adequate representation. See
Laura Evans, Note, Limiting Virtual Representation in Headwaters Inc. v. United States Forest
Service: Lost (Opportunity) in the Oregon Woods?, 33 ECOLOGY L.Q. 725, 749–51 (2006).
396. WASH. SUPER. CT. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(A) (allowing class action where separate actions
against defendant create risk of “inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual
members of the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party
opposing the class”); WASH. SUPER. CT. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2) (allowing class action where defendant
“has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate
final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole”); see,
e.g., Headwaters, 382 F.3d at 1045 (Berzon, J., dissenting in the original, superseded decision).
Judge Berzon pointed out that the Forest Service in Headwaters might have anticipated that
multiple groups would challenge timber sales, and it could have made an effort to bring all those
groups into the litigation before it settled the case.
397. WASH. SUPER. CT. R. CIV. P. 22(a) (“Persons having claims against the plaintiff may be
joined as defendants and required to interplead when their claims are such that the plaintiff is or
may be exposed to double or multiple liability.”)
398. WASH. SUPER. CT. R. CIV. P. 19. The necessary party joinder rule makes plaintiffs
responsible for “pleading reasons for nonjoinder” when they fail to join any persons they know are
potentially joinable under the rule. WASH. SUPER. CT. R. CIV. P. 19(c).
399. WASH. SUPER. CT. R. CIV. P. 24.
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runs counter to Martin v. Wilks. 400
One scholar summed up the situation that calls out for a public law
exception to preclusion:
The specific problem involved in Martin v. Wilks is simply one
illustration of the many problems encountered in litigation that
seeks broad-gauged remedies that inevitably will affect many
persons. Whether the subject involves employment
discrimination,
school
practices,
prison
conditions,
environmental control, or other pervasive problems, there is a
deep-seated tension between the need to provide a hearing for all
affected by the decree and the need to establish a workably final
disposition. Mandatory joinder through Rule 19, class actions, or
possibly other representation devices, does indeed seem a better
answer than attempting to develop an administrable rule of
mandatory intervention. None of these devices is particularly
satisfying, however, and better solutions must be developed.
These solutions will be intended to support the result that
present procedures do not support—effectively final decrees in
institutional reform litigation. 401
The Supreme Court has opted not to create a public law exception to
privity, in both Taylor and in Richards. 402 So despite the logical appeal
of such an exception, it may be doomed to fail eventually in both the
federal and state courts. 403

400. Professors Redish and Katt observe that Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989), makes it
proper to place on the existing parties the duty to join outsiders or risk a second suit that threatens
their judgment:
The argument breaks down, however, when it is only the absent party who realizes his
relevance to the suit. In Wilks, the Court’s reasoning is based on the assumption that parties
will have superior knowledge about who should be in the case. Whether or not the absent
person is the sole actor to have actual knowledge of the first case’s relevance to her, however,
is simply a question of fact. While making this factual determination may be difficult, as noted
by the Court in Wilks, incurring this difficulty is a small price to pay for avoiding the danger of
contradictory liability. Furthermore, although the reasoning of Wilks is generally instructive,
Congress overruled its applicability to employment discrimination cases, essentially creating a
legislatively dictated mandatory intervention scheme. This statute has not been successfully
challenged on constitutional grounds, suggesting that although mandatory intervention is not
ideal, it is at least constitutional.
Redish & Katt, supra note 229, at 1917 (footnotes omitted) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(n)(1)(2012)).
401. 18A WRIGHT, MILLER, & COOPER, supra note 115, § 4452.
402. See supra notes 377–386 and accompanying text.
403. A clear illustration of how federal courts are likely to interpret this argument for a publiclaw exception is found in Rodriguez v. City of Albuquerque, No. CIV 07-0901 JB/ACT, 2008 WL
5978925 (D.N.M. Dec. 22, 2008). Based on Taylor v. Sturgell, the district court rejected an
argument that preclusion should bind city employees who declined to opt into a prior lawsuit
brought by other city employees under the Fair Labor Standards Act. The court stated “If the Court
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To be sure, Washington courts have more latitude on this question
than do federal courts: pragmatically, it is relatively unlikely that a case
like In re Coday would ever be scrutinized by the federal courts and fail
the due process test. If challenged, the nonparty preclusion rules in
Washington could be defensible if the courts deploy the doctrine only in
those rare cases that involve a high risk of repeated litigation on a
question of public interest, and in which serial litigation could lead to
conflicting judgments that create incompatible demands on public
officials. In that type of case, the high risk to institutional values might
justify limiting individual litigant autonomy rights.
If the Washington Supreme Court chooses to retain the Coday rule,
the courts should use the rule sparingly. Before binding nonparties, a
court should explicitly articulate how the right asserted in the first
proceeding is a right common to the public at large, which would satisfy
the caveat in Richards. 404 In addition, the court should examine carefully
the adequacy of representation in the initial suit,405 and consider whether
the parties to that suit did enough to join interested parties with a similar
stake in the right being asserted. 406
Alternatively, the Washington legislature could solve the problem
through statute, based on the Supreme Court’s statement in Richards,
echoed in Taylor, about states having “wide latitude” to limit the number
of judicial proceedings that challenge government actions that affect the
public at large. 407
The court should abandon virtual representation and nonparty
preclusion in cases that involve only private disputes, such as Garcia v.
Wilson 408 and World Wide Video of Washington, Inc. v. City of
Spokane. 409 As Professor Trautman emphasized, preclusion is a courtwere to adopt the City of Albuquerque’s position on preclusion, those employees electing not to opt
into the earlier case would find the judgment in that case nonetheless binding them, despite their
choice and without their participation,” effectively transforming the case into a “mandatory classaction[ ].” Observing that this would undermine Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) (the opt-out class action
rule), and that “due process requires clarity,” the court concluded that preclusion would be
“fundamentally unfair.” 2008 WL 5978925, at *2.
404. See supra note 381 and accompanying text.
405. See supra note 376.
406. See supra notes 396–400 and accompanying text.
407. See supra notes 378–388 and accompanying text.
408. Garcia v. Wilson, 63 Wash. App 516, 820 P.2d 964 (1991).
409. World Wide Video of Wash., Inc. may look like a case on a question of public interest
because it involves a city ordinance regarding the location of adult entertainment facilities. But it is
better characterized as a private dispute: the judgment to which the courts gave preclusive effect
was an individual litigant’s claim under the First Amendment. There was no risk that Spokane
would be subject to inconsistent judgments if the courts permitted a new litigant to pursue the
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created concept that can—and should—be adjusted to accommodate one
of its primary objectives: fairness to litigants.410 Allowing nonparty
preclusion in private disputes can produce only meager savings in
judicial efficiency. In fact, the savings may be non-existent, because the
number of cases in which nonparties are forced to drop claims, and thus
save the cost of litigation and trial, is very small in comparison to the
number of cases in which parties and courts spend resources arguing and
deciding the question whether non-party preclusion is appropriate. 411
Increased efficiency, if it exists at all, can hardly justify the very real risk
that the doctrine will cast too wide a net and deprive litigants of an
important due process right to a day in court. 412 In addition, containing
nonparty preclusion to only the rarest cases will shift to litigating parties
the responsibility for using existing rules of civil procedure to join other
parties who may have an interest in the litigation—and that, as Professor
Trautman would likely say, is as it should be.
B.

Full Faith and Credit Problems in Washington Courts

Professor Trautman confined his article to the preclusive effects of
judgments within Washington, not addressing how Washington courts
assess the preclusive effect of judgments from federal or other state
courts. 413 In recent years, however, some Washington courts have
stumbled when asked to apply preclusive effect to judgments from
federal courts. 414 The Washington State Supreme Court should
systematize an approach that ensures all courts in Washington consider
full faith and credit implications in all inter-jurisdictional preclusion
situations. The courts’ credibility will be bolstered if they make clear
that they have considered whether the analysis should employ preclusion
rules from Washington law, federal law, or the law of another state.
When a state court evaluates the preclusive effect of a judgment from
another jurisdiction, it must look to the law of the court that rendered the
second case regarding his own challenge to zoning for specific buildings. See World Wide Video of
Wash., Inc. v. City of Spokane, 125 Wash. App. 289, 298–300, 103 P.3d 1265, 1270–71 (2005).
410. Trautman, supra note 1, at 842.
411. See Cross, supra note 390, at 4 (explaining that the economic value of close cases—those
near the margin of a court’s decision standard—is difficult to predict, making these cases more
likely to proceed to trial); supra notes 324–325 and accompanying text.
412. See supra notes 346–361 and accompanying text.
413. Trautman, supra note 1, at 806.
414. This section focuses on federal-to-state preclusion and not state-to-state preclusion. While
both situations present similar challenges, the federal-to-state problem arises more often and has
created noticeable problems.
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judgment. 415 That law should reveal what preclusive effect the judgment
would have in the rendering jurisdiction. 416 This process ensures that the
second jurisdiction gives the judgment the “full faith and credit” it
deserves. 417 In many instances, what law applies is immaterial to the
outcome because both jurisdictions apply the same law of preclusion.
But when jurisdictions have varying standards, the applicable-law
problem can move from merely academic to decisive. 418
The United States Supreme Court clarified what law determines the
preclusive effect of a federal court judgment in a later state court
proceeding in Semtek International Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp. 419 The
Court held that a federal judgment’s preclusive effect is governed by
federal common law, whether the federal court’s jurisdiction was based
on federal question or diversity. 420 But this federal common law can
vary, depending on the basis of the court’s jurisdiction. In federalquestion cases, federal common law aims for and applies uniform rules
of preclusion. 421 “For judgments in diversity cases, federal law
incorporates the rules of preclusion applied by the State in which the
rendering court sits,” 422 unless the state law is “incompatible with
federal interests.” 423
Under this doctrine, a Washington court must take several steps when
a litigant argues for claim or issue preclusion based on a federal court
judgment. First, it needs to determine whether the case was heard under

415. Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 506–07 (2001).
416. This method differs from the choice of law test for substantive law in Washington courts.
“Washington uses the most significant relationship test as articulated by RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 (1971).” FutureSelect Portfolio Mgmt., Inc. v. Tremont Grp.
Holdings, Inc., 180 Wash. 2d 954, 967, 331 P.3d 29, 36 (2014).
417. “Full faith and credit” is required—with varying degrees of specificity—by the Constitution,
a federal statute, and precedent. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1; 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2012); HAZARD,
LEUBSDORF, & BASSETT, supra note 152, § 14.3, at 610. To qualify for full faith and credit, a
judgment must have been final and actually on the merits, rather than decided on strictly procedural
grounds. William L. Reynolds, The Iron Law of Full Faith and Credit, 53 MD. L. REV. 412, 418
(1994). In addition, it must be rendered by a court with jurisdiction over the subject matter and
parties. Id. at 413, 424–30; see Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
418. HAZARD, LEUBSDORF, & BASSETT, supra note 152, § 14.3, at 611.
419. 531 U.S. 497 (2001).
420. Id. at 506–07 (noting that neither the Constitution nor any other textual provision answers
the question of the full faith and credit accorded to federal court judgments); accord Taylor v.
Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 891 (2008) (“The preclusive effect of a federal-court judgment is determined
by federal common law.”).
421. Taylor, 553 U.S. at 891.
422. Id. at 891 n.4 (citing Semtek, 531 U.S. at 508).
423. Semtek, 531 U.S. at 508, 509.

06 - McGinnis, Final Auth with TOC.docx (Do Not Delete)

140

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

4/13/2015 11:49 AM

[Vol. 90:75

diversity or federal question jurisdiction. 424 If federal question, it must
ascertain the federal common law of preclusion, and apply those rules
instead of Washington’s own rules. If the first case was a diversity case,
the Washington court must determine where the federal court was
sitting, and ascertain the preclusion law of that state. 425 Once the state
rules are ascertained, the Washington court must look further, to see if
any federal precedent has concluded that the state law is incompatible
with federal interests. If it passes that test, state preclusion rules apply. 426
What actually happens in state courts? Within a small sample of
modern decisions, some courts do not acknowledge the issue at all, and
apply the wrong law. 427 Some courts are presented with arguments about
which are the proper preclusion rules to apply, but simply default to
Washington law. 428 And some courts properly analyze the full faith and
credit requirements. 429 Overall, Washington practitioners could do a
better job arguing which rules should apply, and Washington courts
should be more systematic in handling judgments from other
jurisdictions.
The most noteworthy example of a Washington case that incorrectly
424. If the basis for federal court jurisdiction is not apparent from the record, a court should seek
additional information. See, e.g., Louie v. BFS Retail & Commercial Operations, LLC, 178 Cal.
App. 4th 1544, 1554 (2009). Here, the court requested and took judicial notice of the federal
complaint, which the parties had not supplied. The court ascertained that it should apply federal
law—even while recognizing that federal and state preclusion law were identical on the relevant
point.
425. Notably, not all diversity cases will have involved courts sitting in Washington, so courts
should not assume diversity jurisdiction means a default to Washington preclusion law. Courts may
also encounter the issue of what law applies when the federal court had jurisdiction under both
federal question and diversity jurisdiction, or both federal question and supplemental jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1367. There is no readily ascertainable answer to this question, and Semtek
provided no answers. See GEOFFREY HAZARD, COLIN TAIT, WILLIAM FLETCHER, & STEPHEN
BUNDY, PLEADING AND PROCEDURE STATE AND FEDERAL 560–61 (10th ed. 2009). But logic
suggests that the court should look to the jurisdictional basis for the individual claims on which
judgment was entered, and apply preclusion law accordingly.
426. Semtek, 531 U.S. at 508–09.
427. See, e.g., World Wide Video of Wash., Inc. v. City of Spokane, 125 Wash. App. 289, 103
P.3d 1265, review denied, 155 Wash. 2d 1014, 122 P.3d 186 (2005) (applying Washington
preclusion law to judgment of federal court on federal question case); Nielson By & Through
Nielson v. Spanaway Gen. Med. Clinic, Inc., 135 Wash. 2d 255, 259–62, 956 P.2d 312, 314–15
(1998) (applying Washington preclusion law to judgment of federal court on Federal Tort Claims
Act case); Cunningham v. State, 61 Wash. App. 562, 564, 811 P.2d 225, 226–27 (1991) (same).
428. See, e.g., Thompson v. King Cnty., 163 Wash. App. 184, 190, 259 P.3d 1138, 1141 (2011);
Kuhlman v. Thomas, 78 Wash. App. 115, 120 n.3, 897 P.2d 365, 368 n.3 (1995).
429. See, e.g., Loveridge v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 72 Wash. App. 720, 724, 864 P.2d 417, 419 (1993),
aff’d, 125 Wash. 2d 759, 887 P.2d 898 (1995); Kowalow v. Corr. Servs. Corp., 115 Wash. App.
1039, No. 49025–7–I, 2003 WL 352832 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003); Déjà Vu-Everett-Fed. Way, Inc. v.
City of Federal Way, 96 Wash. App. 255, 261–63, 979 P.2d 464, 467–68 (1999).
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applied Washington preclusion law to a prior federal court judgment is
World Wide Video of Washington, Inc. 430 The underlying judgment
dismissed a First Amendment claim in federal court. 431 Because the
federal court had federal question jurisdiction over the claim, federal
preclusion law should have applied to determine that judgment’s
preclusive effect. 432 Without discussing an alternative choice, the court
instead applied Washington’s liberal doctrine of nonparty preclusion. 433
Even in 2005 (pre-Taylor v. Sturgell), federal law and state law differed
greatly with regard to nonparty preclusion. 434 Applying the correct
preclusion rules would likely have preserved Mr. Barbanti’s opportunity
to pursue his litigation in state court. 435 In other words, applying the
wrong preclusion law was outcome-determinative.
At least three other relatively recent Washington cases have applied
state law to federal court judgments without discussing the full faith and
credit issue. 436 In one, the court said that it was applying Washington
law because the parties had not raised the issue. 437 Two other cases
applied Washington law to federal court judgments under the Federal
Tort Claims Act. 438 None of the parties in these FTCA cases argued
whether state or federal law governed, but had they done so, there might

430. 125 Wash. App. at 300, 103 P.3d at 1270–71 (discussed supra notes 311–322 and
accompanying text).
431. World Wide Video of Wash., Inc. v. City of Spokane, 227 F. Supp. 2d 1143, 1170 (E.D.
Wash. 2002).
432. See supra notes 419–423 and accompanying text.
433. World Wide Video of Wash., Inc., 125 Wash. App. at 305–306, 103 P.3d at 1274. Although
the court did not use the “virtual representation” terminology, the court used the basic concept when
it held a nonparty witness bound because he testified and failed to intervene in the preceding case.
434. Compare Headwaters Inc. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 399 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 2005) (reversing use
of claim preclusion against new plaintiffs, an advocacy group that filed same complaint using same
lawyers as similar advocacy group; discussed supra note 395), with Garcia v. Wilson, 63 Wash.
App. 516, 820 P.2d 964 (1991) (allowing issue preclusion against plaintiff who had been witness in
her friend’s lawsuit; discussed supra notes 273–290).
435. In the Washington Court of Appeals, neither Mr. Barbanti nor the City of Spokane argued
whether federal or state law should determine the preclusive effect of the federal judgment. Both
parties relied on Washington preclusion law in their briefing, so it is unsurprising that the Court of
Appeals did the same.
436. Spahi v. Hughes-Nw., Inc., 107 Wash. App. 763, 27 P.3d 1233 (2001), modified, 33 P.3d 84
(2001); Nielson By & Through Nielson v. Spanaway Gen. Med. Clinic, Inc., 135 Wash. 2d 255, 956
P.2d 312 (1998); Cunningham v. State, 61 Wash. App. 562, 566, 811 P.2d 225, 227 (1991).
437. Spahi, 107 Wash. App. at 769 n.4, 27 P.3d at 1235 n.4 (federal court judgment on civil
forfeiture quiet title claims).
438. Nielson, 135 Wash. 2d at 259, 956 P.2d at 314 (allowing claim preclusion based on
judgment in FTCA case); Cunningham, 61 Wash. App. at 564, 569–70, 811 P.2d at 227, 229
(allowing issue preclusion based on judgment in FTCA case).
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have been an interesting debate about whether the federal common law
would point the courts to state law or federal. 439 Still, the lack of
discussion of either full faith and credit or applicable law suggests a
blind spot in the Washington courts.
Two frequently-cited Washington cases applied the wrong preclusion
law despite litigants’ arguments that federal preclusion rules should
apply. 440 In one case, the Washington Court of Appeals refused to apply
federal law because “under either test, the result in this case would
remain the same. Therefore, we simply apply the Washington test and do
not reach the issue.” 441 A recent court of appeals case relied on the same
reasoning to avoid the full faith and credit analysis. 442
Of course, many Washington judges adeptly handle the question. One
of the best opinions explained that,
439. This seems to be an open question. The Supreme Court has interpreted the FTCA to require
that a federal district court apply the whole law—including choice-of-law rules—of the state where
the negligent act or omission occurred. Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 10 (1962). An
argument can be made that this choice of law reference should include both substantive and
procedural rules, and should include choice of law as to the law of preclusion—just as the judgment
of a court sitting in diversity is examined via state preclusion law. However, the few courts that
have addressed the preclusion context specifically have concluded that the FTCA presents a unique
situation in which state law governs substantive issues only. See Johnson v. United States, 576 F.2d
606, 611–12 (5th Cir. 1978) (applying federal common law of preclusion; many years before
Semtek); Donohue ex rel. Estate of Donohue v. United States, No. 1:05-CV175, 2006 WL 2990387,
at *4 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 18, 2006) (agreeing with Fifth Circuit and applying federal law to determine
the preclusive effect of a federal court’s FTCA judgment; post-Semtek decision); Gardner v. United
States, 443 F. App’x 70, 74 n.1 (6th Cir. 2011) (noting Donohue and Johnson used federal
preclusion law, and assuming—absent a dispute by parties—that federal rather than state law
controls).
440. Thompson v. King Cnty., 163 Wash. App. 184, 259 P.3d 1138 (2011); Kuhlman v. Thomas,
78 Wash. App. 115, 897 P.2d 365 (1995).
441. Kuhlman, 78 Wash. App. at 120 n.3, 897 P.2d at 368 n.3. There is a plausible reason for
avoiding the issue, and it is based in Washington’s approach to conflict of laws analysis on
substantive matters. When choice of law is disputed, “there must be an actual conflict between the
laws or interests of Washington and the laws or interests of another state before Washington courts
will engage in a conflict of laws analysis.” Seizer v. Sessions, 132 Wash. 2d 642, 648, 940 P.2d
261, 264 (1997), quoted in FutureSelect Portfolio Mgmt., Inc. v. Tremont Grp. Holdings, Inc., 180
Wash. 2d 954, 967, 331 P.3d 29, 36 (2014). It is possible that the Kuhlman court chose to extend
this principle from the realm of substantive choice of law to the choice of preclusion law under full
faith and credit principles, although it did not explain its rationale in this way.
442. Thompson, 163 Wash. App. at 190 n.1, 259 P.3d at 1141 n.1. It is a well-known principle of
jurisprudence that courts should avoid deciding unnecessary issues, but that hardly seems to excuse
the courts’ failure to apply the correct law. Even if the result would be the same, the courts are
creating sloppy precedent that is relied on by later cases—perpetuating an incorrect view of the law.
For example, World Wide Video of Washington, Inc. involved hot-button issues of zoning and the
First Amendment, as well as preclusion law. It is cited for all those points, lulling readers into a
sense that it was proper to apply state law to determine the preclusive effect of a federal judgment.
See, e.g., Mansfield v. Pfaff, No. C14–0948JLR, 2014 WL 4269508, at *7 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 27,
2014).
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Under principles of federal supremacy, a federal judgment must
be given full faith and credit in the state courts, which includes
recognition of the res judicata effect of the federal judgment.
Moreover, “[f]ederal law determines the preclusive effect of
federal orders on a question of federal law, regardless of
whether the court applying the federal judgment is state or
federal.” 443
Other examples of properly-chosen preclusion law include Déjà VuEverett-Fed. Way, Inc. v. City of Federal Way, 444 and Kowalow v.
Correctional Services Corp. 445 The latter case explicitly rejected an
argument that it was an open question whether state or federal law
applied to a federal court judgment on various federal law claims. 446 In
addition, federal courts appear routinely to include this analysis in interjurisdictional preclusion situations.447
When entertaining a preclusion defense, the Washington courts
should always consider the full faith and credit due to judgments from
federal courts and other state courts. Admittedly, applying the wrong law
does not often make a difference in outcome, given the interjurisdictional consistency on most points of preclusion law. But those
litigants who lose an opportunity to bring a claim because of this sort of
mistake have good reason to complain about the Draconian result, and
the legitimacy of decision-making will be tarnished.
The Washington State Supreme Court should systematize a routine
through which all Washington courts take full faith and credit principles
into account whenever they assess the preclusive effect of a judgment
from a federal or other state court. This kind of protocol will remove any
443. Loveridge v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 72 Wash. App. 720, 724, 864 P.2d 417, 419 (1993), aff’d,
125 Wash. 2d 759, 887 P.2d 898 (1995) (internal citations omitted) (quoting Nutter v. Monongahela
Power Co., 4 F.3d 319, 321 (4th Cir. 1993)). Significantly, the court recognized that full faith and
credit for federal court judgments is grounded in the Supremacy Clause—not the Full Faith and
Credit clause or statute, as some courts have stated. See, e.g., Woodley v. Myers Capital Corp., 67
Wash. App. 328, 336, 835 P.2d 239, 243 (1992).
444. 96 Wash. App. 255, 262, 979 P.2d 464, 467–68 (1999) (applying federal law of claim
preclusion based on a federal court first amendment challenge; also applying Washington issue
preclusion law to judgment from a separate but related case litigated in state court).
445. 115 Wash. App. 1039, No. 49025–7–I, 2003 WL 352832 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003).
446. Id. at *2 n.4. The court distinguished Kuhlman, 78 Wash. App. 115, 897 P.2d 365, noting
that the “Kuhlman court simply stated that it did not need to reach the issue because the result
would have been the same under federal or state law.” Kowalow, 2003 WL 352832, at *2 n.4.
447. See, e.g., Jones v. Grant Cnty., Wash., CV–12–0188–EFS, 2014 WL 2196508, at *5 (E.D.
Wash. May 27, 2014) (noting that “[a] federal court considering whether to apply issue preclusion
based on a prior state court judgment must look to state preclusion law”); Zweber v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 39 F. Supp. 3d 1161, 1165 (W.D. Wash. 2014) (“The court looks to the law of
the forum state—here Washington—to determine the preclusive effect of a state court judgment.”).
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uncertainty about whether the court actually considered and applied the
correct rules of preclusion—in keeping with the kind of clear and
pragmatic approach that Professor Trautman urged three decades ago.
CONCLUSION
Professor Trautman’s commentary on claim and issue preclusion in
Washington courts has proved a valuable resource for practitioners and
courts alike. He advocated a retreat from complexity in the doctrine and
a focus on process that is clear, usable, efficient, and fair. While
Washington courts have moved in this direction in many aspects of
preclusion law, work remains to be done—on problems that Professor
Trautman identified and on problems later to surface.
The Washington Supreme Court should step in to resolve these
problems; although the lower courts have some scope in working
towards their own solutions, they lack clear guidance from the state’s
highest court. Most critically, the Court should grant review in a case
that allows it to clarify the law concerning preclusion of nonparties, and
ensure that its use conforms to due process. The Court should abandon
the discredited doctrine of virtual representation, and adhere to the
United States Supreme Court’s guidance on when a court can preclude
litigants who were not parties to the original action. If the Court retains
the Coday rule, the Court should insist that the doctrine be used only in
cases involving a public rather than private right, and insist on careful
analysis of the adequacy of representation in the first proceeding. Better
yet, the Court should encourage parties to the first action on an issue of
public concern to explore the potential for joining all interested parties,
using existing joinder rules. This would help the courts avoid
controversial decisions on the scope of nonparty preclusion.
When given the opportunity, the Washington State Supreme Court
should create a more streamlined test for claim preclusion. The core
elements of claim preclusion—identical parties and identical causes of
action—sufficiently capture any situation in which a difference in
quality of persons would otherwise defeat preclusion. In contrast, the
current four-element test is messy and inefficient, and is not an effective
screening tool for claim preclusion. The Court should merge the same
subject matter requirement into the same cause of action requirement. It
should fold the quality of persons test into the existing test for identical
parties or persons. And it should adopt the transactional nucleus test of
the Restatement (Second) of Judgments, § 24, as the preferred test for
analyzing identity of claims. The transactional test is malleable yet clear,
and is a good replacement for the duplicative four-factor test courts
currently feel compelled to use. Changing the test in these ways would
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simplify the analysis required of practitioners and courts alike, making
litigation more efficient and outcomes more predictable. Those were the
primary goals Professor Trautman advanced in his article, and his call
for clear and usable rules of claim preclusion is just as important now as
it was three decades ago.
Finally, the Court should set the expectation that every Washington
court must properly analyze full faith and credit rules when determining
the preclusive effect of judgments from federal courts and other state
courts. If Washington courts make it clear that they are applying the
correct law, their preclusion decisions will be credible; if they are
credible, they will provide optimal guidance to practitioners who must
advise clients, and to future decision-makers.
These corrective actions would be consistent with Professor
Trautman’s advocacy of doctrinal clarity, pragmatism, and doing justice.
They would help Washington courts function more efficiently and fairly,
and would enhance the courts’ legitimacy. And they would help
Washington lawyers better advise clients on a somewhat arcane and
rarely-examined but important doctrine.

